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ABSTRACT
This dissertation addresses a simple question: Why are some members of congress very 
responsive to the ideological preferences of their constituency while others appear to ignore their 
constituency? Although numerous scholars have explored this issue, they have consistently: (1) 
limited their analyses to the influence of member characteristics while ignoring the potentially 
significant influence of constituent factors and (2) failed to test a single comprehensive model of 
congressional responsiveness that considers the full range of member and constituent factors 
hypothesized to influence variation in congressional responsiveness.
This dissertation directly addresses these two problems by developing and testing a 
comprehensive model of congressional representation that focuses on both the influence of 
constituent and member conditions on variation in congressional representation. Specifically, I 
examine the influence of electoral margins, congressional retirement electoral proximity, 
congressional seniority, constituency homogeneity, and constituency political engagement
My analyses suggest that constituent conditions play a significant role in explaining 
variation in congressional responsiveness. In particular, I find that members from relatively 
homogeneous and politically engaged constituencies are significantly more responsive to the 
preferences of their constituents. I argue that this is because relatively homogeneous 
constituencies send relatively consistent signals regarding their preferences, while politically 
engaged constituencies are more likely to make their preferences known and punish members of 
congress who are not responsive to them. Surprisingly, I find that the influence of member 
conditions on variation in congressional responsiveness appears to be minimal and their influence 
varies between chambers of congress.
Ultimately, I conclude, much of the variation exhibited in congressional representation is 
not random, but rather systematically associated with various member and constituent 
characteristics. Moreover, constituent factors play a vital role in this process and future research 
by congressional scholars must recognize this role if they are to fully understand the factors that 
influence congressional representation.
vii
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Because in our administration it hath respect not to the few, but to the 
multitude, our form of government is called a democracy.
Pericles
REPRESENTATION
The problem of representation has always been a central focus of discussions over the 
function and behavior of both legislatures and legislators. The nature of the representational 
relationship has been contemplated by numerous theorists, ranging from early philosophers such 
as Edmund Burke (1887), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1913), to contemporary scholars such as 
J. Roland Pennock (1952), Heinz Eulau (1959), Hanna Pitkin (1967), and Robert Dahl (1989).
Representation is particularly important to democratic theory. According to Eulau (1959), 
representation is what makes democratic legislatures both legitimate and authoritative decision­
making institutions. Likewise, Key (1961) notes, the representation of public opinion is widely 
regarded as one of the distinguishing characteristics of democracy. Moreover, Robert Dahl (1989) 
has argued that the primary justification for democratic governments is found in their ability to 
provide an orderly and peaceful process for representation to occur.
Considering the important role that representation plays in democracies, the study of 
representation has occupied a central place in the field of political science and has long captivated 
the interest of both theorists and empirical analysts. This dissertation reflects that concern.
Most of the theoretical writing about representation has dealt with the normative question: 
what should the relationship be between the representative and the represented? Are legislators 
free to act as they please? Should they use their own judgment to do what is best for their 
constituents? Are representatives, by definition, expected to reflect accurately the opinions of their 
constituents?
Representation is clearly an extremely rich and complex concept in political theory and can 
be defined in a great many ways. Mandate theorists maintain that true representation occurs only 
when representatives act on explicit instructions from their constituents, and any exercise of 
discretion is a deviation from this ideal. Conversely, independence theorists see the representative 
as a free agent, a trustee or an expert, who is best left alone to do his work. Formalistic
1
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representation, however, emphasizes legal controls that the public has over the selection and 
tenure of officials. Finally, demographic representation is concerned with whether officials and the 
public are similar in terms of demographic characteristics, such as race, sex, and social class.
Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) seminal work. The Concept of Representation, provides what is
perhaps the most comprehensive review of the theoretical writing on representation. Pitkin argues
that the prolonged debate over representation has unfortunately failed to produce any true solution.
She attributes this failure to the idea that both sides of the mandate-independence controversy,
which has been the focus of much of the theoretical writing on the subject, are partially correct but
incomplete. If either position is advanced to it’s logical extreme, she argues, the result is not
actually representation. She concludes that most definitions of representation are of limited value
to scholars and cannot “tell us anything about what goes on during representation, how a
representative ought to act or what he is expected to do, and how to tell whether he has
represented well or badly.” (Pitkin 1967, 58) Ultimately Pitkin provides a new and more complete
definition of representation:
Representation...means acting in the interest of the represented, in a 
manner responsive to them. The representative must act 
independently; his actions must involve discretion and judgment; he 
must be the one who acts. The represented must also be capable of 
independent action and judgment, not merely being taken care of. And, 
despite the resulting potential for conflict between representative and 
represented about what is to be done, that conflict must not normally 
take place.... He must not be found persistently at odds with the wishes 
of the represented without good reason in terms of their interest without 
a good explanation of why their wishes are not in accord with their 
interest (Pitkin 1967, 209-210)
While the concept of representation continues to be a widely debated and analyzed, most 
political scholars have generally accepted Pitkin's definition of representation or some variant of it 
Consequently, recent analyses have become less concerned with the theoretical or historical 
meaning of representation and more concerned with whether or not legislators actually heed the 
preferences of their constituents (Weissberg 1979). Rather, the principal question has been: Do 
legislators reflect in their roll-call behavior the policy preferences of their constituents? Likewise, in 
this dissertation I do not engage in the normative arguments over the meaning of representation;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
rather I focus on the various factors that influence the responsiveness of legislators to the general 
policy preferences, or more accurately the ideological preferences, of their constituents.
I ask the question: Are (extremely) conservative districts represented by (extremely) 
conservative congressmen? Are (extremely) liberal districts represented by (extremely) liberal 
congressmen? Are relatively moderate districts represented by relatively moderate congressmen? 
But, most importantly, how do various constituent and legislator conditions influence this 
relationship? In particular, how do marginal elections, electoral proximity, congressional seniority, 
the decision to retire, and politically engaged or heterogeneous constituencies influence the 
representative relationship? Fundamentally, what explains variation in congressional 
responsiveness across legislators and constituencies.
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON REPRESENTATION
While numerous scholars have examined the responsiveness of congressmen to 
constituent preferences and the various conditions that influence this relationship, their analyses 
have produced at best conflicting and inconsistent answers. Difficulties in measuring constituent 
preferences have contributed significantly to the inconsistent and contradictory results of this 
research, but conflicting hypotheses, differences in study design, and incomplete models have also 
played an important part
The bulk of recent empirical research on representation can be traced back to Miller and 
Stokes (1963) classic work “Constituency Influence in Congress." Employing surveys of 
constituents and congressmen, their influential study attempted to estimate the extent of policy 
agreement between congressmen and their districts across three issue domains: social welfare, 
foreign affairs, and civil rights. While Miller and Stokes found that the linkage between district 
preferences and roll call behavior was reasonably high for civil rights issues, they found this 
relationship was significantly weaker with regard to social welfare issues and was actually negative 
with regard to foreign policy issues.
Like Miller and Stokes study, most contemporary research on representation has continued 
to focus on the policy responsiveness of congressmen to single issue or policy domains rather than 
general responsiveness. However, while Miller and Stokes focused on variation in the
3
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responsiveness of legislators to different issue domains, most recent representation research has 
focused on the various legislator and constituent conditions that influence the degree to which 
representation occurs. Factors hypothesized to influence levels of congressional representation 
include: electoral marginality, proximity to the next election, legislator’s future retirement plans, 
seniority, political engagement, and district heterogeneity. Of these factors, legislator 
characteristics, and particularly the electoral victory margin of legislators, have by far received the 
most attention.
Unfortunately, the wealth of research on the influence of legislator and constituency factors 
on representation has produced little conclusive evidence. Consequently, we still know little 
regarding the factors that influence levels of congressional representation. As noted above, this is 
largely due to conflicting hypotheses, poor measures of constituent ideology, and incomplete 
models of congressional representation.
While in this dissertation I do not propose to provide the final or definitive analysis of 
congressional representation; I do: (1) integrate the numerous and conflicting hypotheses, (2) 
provide an improved measure of constituent ideology, and ultimately (3) take a step toward 
clarifying many of the questions of congressional representation with an examination of a single 
model of representation which explores the full range of factors hypothesized to mediate legislative 
congressional responsiveness.
The primary focus of my dissertation, however, is on the effects of district heterogeneity on 
the representative relationship. While numerous scholars have discussed the topic of district 
heterogeneity, few have fully examined the implications of this concept for legislative 
representation. In hopes of filling this void, I consider more fully the theoretical and empirical 
implications of district heterogeneity on representation. Specifically, what is the effect of district 
heterogeneity on congressmen's adherence to constituency preferences? Are legislators more 
responsive to constituency opinion in relatively homogeneous districts, where the expression of 
preferences is more likely to be clear and consistent? Is the job of a representative more difficult in 
heterogeneous districts in which the signals emanating from constituents are more likely to be 
ambiguous and/or in conflict?
4
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i hypothesize that legislators from heterogeneous districts will be less responsive to their 
constituents than legislators from homogeneous districts. The theoretical rationale underlying this 
hypothesis is simple. Arguably, homogeneous districts will have constituencies that have relatively 
homogeneous interests, at least in comparison to heterogeneous districts. When relatively 
homogeneous constituencies convey their interests to their elected representatives, those 
representatives receive relatively clear signals about what is expected of them. Confronted with 
relatively clear signals from their constituents, legislators are hard pressed to deviate from the 
policy preferences of their constituents; for fear that they subject themselves to an enhanced threat 
of electoral defeat in subsequent elections. Conversely, heterogeneous constituencies are more 
likely to convey conflicting and ambiguous signals to their representatives than homogeneous 
constituencies. The complexity of policy signals emanating from diverse districts leaves legislators 
with few tangible constituency messages with which to make roll-call decisions. Given this, I 
conclude, legislators from heterogeneous districts will be less responsive to their constituents than 
legislators from homogeneous districts.
This dissertation proceeds as follows. In chapter 2 ,1 provide an overview of prior research 
on congressional representation. This chapter begins with a review of Miller and Stokes’ classic 
work, “Constituency Influence in Congress" and several of the works that have reexamined and 
questioned Miller and Stokes’ initial findings. Next I provide a comprehensive review of the 
extensive body of research that has explored the influence of various legislator characteristics on 
variation in responsiveness. I then turn my focus to the limited research that has tested the 
influence of constituent conditions on patterns of representation. Finally, the chapter will conclude 
with a brief discussion of the factors that have led to the inconsistent and conflicting results found 
throughout this body of research.
Chapter 3 provides a theoretical discussion of the factors hypothesized to influence 
congressional representation. While the first section focuses on the characteristics of legislators 
that are hypothesized to influence levels of congressional representation, the second section 
focuses on the often ignored constituent factors hypothesized to influence congressional 
representation. The chapter begins with a discussion of the numerous hypotheses regarding the
5
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
influence of electoral margins on congressional representation. Unlike previous research, my 
discussion considers many of the competing and seemingly conflicting hypotheses regarding the 
influence of electoral margins on congressional representation. Next I examine the conflicting 
hypotheses regarding the possible influence of congressional seniority and retirement on 
representation. Finally, the first section of this chapter concludes with a discussion of the electoral 
proximity hypothesis, which addresses the influence of six-year terms on representation in the U.S. 
Senate.
The second section of this chapter focuses on the frequently overlooked constituent 
factors hypothesized to influence congressional representation. The first constituent characteristic 
that I address is the influence of political sophistication, or rather political engagement of 
constituents on representation. Next I provide an extensive discussion of the numerous and 
diverse hypotheses regarding the influence of constituent heterogeneity on congressional 
representation.
Chapter 4 addresses the data and measures that I will use to test my model of 
congressional representation. I begin with a review the various measures of roll call behavior that 
previous scholars have used in their analyses of congressional representation and exhibit why 
Poole and Rosenthal's measures are the most accurate and reliable. Next, I provide a 
comprehensive review of the key challenge for all analyses of congressional representation, 
measuring constituent ideology. Countless scholars have attempted to overcome the challenge of 
measuring constituent preferences in numerous ways, including the use of demographic variables, 
small-sample estimates of public opinion, presidential election results and even referenda data. 
After reviewing the strengths and weakness of these various measures of constituent ideology, I 
conclude that Erikson, Wright, and Mclver provide the most accurate and reliable measure of state 
ideology. However, I also conclude that there are currently no adequate measures of 
congressional House district ideology. Considering the limitations of previous measures of 
congressional district ideology, I develop a more reliable and useful measure of congressional 
district opinion by employing an innovative top-down approach to simulating House constituent 
ideology.
6
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Next I briefly review the standard methods of measuring congressional seniority, electoral 
margins, electoral proximity, political sophistication, and political participation. Considering the 
inadequacies of the standard measure of constituent heterogeneity used in previous research, I 
review a new and improved measure of constituent heterogeneity provided by William Koetzle 
(1997).
I conclude chapter 4 with a discussion of the various models of congressional 
representation utilized for my analyses. Furthermore, I briefly review the advantages and various 
statistical issues faced when testing these models.
In Chapter 5, I provide a discussion of the results of my comprehensive models of
congressional representation. The chapter starts with a brief review of the bivariate models of 
congressional representation. The results of these analyses indicate that constituent ideology 
explains a moderate amount of the variation found in congressional voting behavior. Moreover, 
these results confirm the wide variation found in levels of congressional responsiveness.
Next, I discuss my full model of congressional representation and provide a detailed
discussion of the results of each of the factors hypothesized to influence congressional 
responsiveness. Surprisingly, my results point to the prevailing influence of constituent conditions 
on levels of congressional responsiveness. As hypothesized, constituent heterogeneity decreases 
levels of congressional responsiveness while increases in the level of constituent political 
engagement increases congressional responsiveness. As a whole, constituent conditions appear 
to account for more of the variation in congressional responsiveness than member characteristics.
Chapter 6 begins with a brief review and summary of the results of my analyses and the 
contributions of this dissertation. In addition. I discuss the various normative implications of my 
analyses with regard to congressional representation and more broadly, American democracy. 
Moreover, I focus on the implications of my analyses in drawing legislative districts, enacting term 
limits, and ultimately increasing levels of legislative responsiveness.
Finally, I conclude Chapter 6 and the dissertation with suggestions for future research on 
congressional representation. Particularly, I focus on the need for improved measures of 
constituent ideology and the necessity of future research on variation in congressional
7
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responsiveness to consider both the influence of member characteristics and constituent 
conditions on levels of congressional responsiveness.
8
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CHAPTER 2: MILLER AND STOKES AND BEYOND
The normative question of whether democratically elected representatives should vote in a 
manner consistent with their own interests and beliefs, the interest of the entire nation, or the 
interest of their constituents may never be settled. However, the positive empirical question of 
whether representatives faithfully represent their constituents is, at least in principle, knowable.
Unfortunately, the extensive empirical research attempting to answer this simple question
has often been contradictory, with some scholars claiming to have conclusively shown that
representatives systematically ignore the preferences of their constituents, while others seeming to
provide evidence of extraordinary responsiveness. These contradictory findings have resulted
from differences in study design, conceptualization and most importantly difficulties in measuring 
1
constituent ideology.
In this chapter I provide an overview of prior empirical research on congressional 
representation. I begin with a review of Miller and Stokes' classic work, “Constituency Influence in 
Congress," and several of the works which have reexamined and challenged Miller and Stokes’ 
initial conclusions. Next, I provide an extensive review of the considerable body of research that 
has explored the influence of various legislator characteristics on patterns of representation. I then 
turn my focus to the limited research that has examined the influence of constituent characteristics 
on patterns of representation. To conclude, I provide a brief discussion of the factors that have led 
to the inconsistent and contradictory results found in the research on congressional representation.
MILLER AND STOKES
The majority of recent empirical research on congressional representation can be traced 
back to Miiler and Stokes’ (1963) classic work, “Constituency Influence in Congress," in which the 
authors estimated the extent of policy agreement between congressmen and their districts across 
three issue domains: (1) social welfare, (2) foreign affairs, and (3) civil rights. Examining the 
correlations between constituent preferences (measured by the Social Research Center’s 1958
As Fiorina (Fiorina 1974) suggests, given this situation, we might simply throw up our 
hands and go off to study something else. However, Fiorina concludes, at least some political 
scientist consider the study of legislative representation much too important to ignore.
9
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Election Study) and legislator preferences, Miller and Stokes suggested the occurrence of little 
policy agreement between congressmen and their districts. While they found the linkage between 
district preferences and roll call behavior was reasonably strong for civil rights issues, the 
relationship was significantly weaker for social welfare and actually negative with regard to foreign 
policy issues.
The significant impact that Miller and Stokes' ground breaking work has had on the field of
congressional representation is unquestionable, yet surprisingly one typically finds ambivalence
about the validity of Miller and Stokes findings (Clausen 1973; Fiorina 1974; Erikson 1978).
Erikson (1978) argues that this attitude is a consequence of the significant amount of
measurement error found in their analyses. Particularly, the small (average of eleven survey
respondents per Congressional District) and nonrandom samples used in estimating their
2
constituency preferences. Erikson correctly maintains that sampling error for constituency 
preferences causes the correlations with congressional behavior to be more seriously attenuated 
than Miller and Stokes recognize. Considering this weakness, Erikson uses measures of 
simulated constituency preferences for his analyses and finds that Miller and Stokes significantly 
underestimated the influence of constituency preferences on congressional behavior. Ultimately, 
Erikson argues, there appears to be more congressional responsiveness to constituency 
preferences than previously realized by Miller and Stokes, and he attributes the evident 
representation to several sources. He notes that while representation occurs because legislators 
respond to perceived constituency preferences, it is partially inadvertent - the result of legislators 
being members of their own constituencies and therefore holding many of the same values and 
attitudes as their constituents. However, based on Erikson’s findings that winning candidates 
displayed higher correlations with constituent district opinion than losing candidates, Erikson 
argues, the most important control constituents have over their members of congress’ attitudes is 
through the electoral process.
2
Although Miller and Stokes anticipated this criticism and made note of it in their original 
work, their optimistic evaluation of the sampling problem seems to have been ignored.
10
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Christopher Achen (Achen 1978) also questions the results of Miller and Stokes’ analysis. 
While Achen does not suggest the small samples utilized in Miller and Stokes analysis are a 
severe problem, he does question the compatibility of the legislator and constituent surveys 
employed in their analysis, their use of ordinal data to create a continuous scale, and their reliance 
on simple correlations between legislators and constituents as a measure of representation. After 
employing a more comprehensive measure of representation, Achen concludes that all issue 
dimensions are equally represented and, in contrast to Erikson's findings, winning candidates are 
typically less representative than losing candidates.
In addition to Achen (1978) and Erikson (1978), several other prominent scholars have 
revisited the Miller and Stokes’ data and offered alternative analyses. In particular, Weissberg 
(1976) and Hurley (1980) employ the Miller and Stokes data to measure the extent of collective 
representation. Weissberg concludes the public is better represented collectively than dyadically 
and that “collective representation will never be worse than dyadic representation." (Weissberg 
1978, 546) However, Hurley argues that Weissberg’s conclusions are biased by his theory and 
suggests that collective representation need not be better than dyadic.
INFLUENCE OF LEGISLATOR CONDITIONS ON REPRESENTATION
Since Miller and Stokes’ classic work, congressional scholars have continued struggling to 
understand the conditions that may hinder or promote congressional responsiveness. While Miller 
and Stokes and those who replicated their analysis primarily focused on the degree to which 
representation varies by issue domains, scholars have more recently focused on the numerous 
legislator and constituent conditions which may explain variation in legislative responsiveness.
This section focuses on the literature that has examined the influence of various legislator 
conditions on congressional responsiveness. The influence of elections in the representative 
process has received the bulk of attention from scholars examining influence on congressional 
responsiveness. It is hypothesized that a member’s desire for reelection forces them to be 
responsive to the constituents in their district This topic has been examined with regard to the 
influence of electoral victory margins, member’s decision to retire, and, for Senators, the proximity 
to the next election. The influence of congressional seniority on responsiveness has also received
11
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considerable attention by legislative scholars. While several scholars have suggested the benefits 
of congressional seniority insulate members and allow even unresponsive members to be 
reelected, others have argued that the political market quickly filters out unresponsive members; 
therefore, only those who are responsive to their constituents will remain in office and attain 
seniority. Finally, whether legislators view themselves as delegates has been found to significantly 
influence their level of responsiveness. Unfortunately, due to the difficulties in attaining legislator 
role orientations, this line of research has been quite limited.
ELECTORAL THREAT
Among the variables deemed as mediating the relationship between constituency 
preferences and legislative roll-call behavior, electoral threat has undoubtedly received the most 
attention. This is not surprising, considering the idea that elections are at the core of the 
democratic process and are expected to keep congressmen in line and responsive. Several 
legislator factors or conditions have been associated with the electoral threat hypotheses. These 
include the size of the electoral margins or rather the level of electoral competition in the district, 
the decision of legislators not to seek re-election and retire, and finally, for Senators, the proximity 
to their next reelection. The following section addresses in detail the literature that examines each 
of these factors associated with the electoral threat hypothesis.
MARGINAL ELECTIONS
Supporters of the electoral marginality hypothesis argue members from electorally 
"marginal" districts will exhibit higher levels of responsiveness to the policy preferences of their 
constituents than members representing "safe" districts, since the former are deemed as more 
vulnerable to the "rational Gods of vengeance and reward" that inhabit their districts. In the familiar 
role terminology that pervades legislative research, marginal representatives must act as 
“delegates" while safe representatives can act as “trustees.”
Numerous scholars have measured the impact of electoral marginality on congressional 
responsiveness, but the results of these studies have been anything but consistent While initial 
empirical research appeared to unmistakably confirm the electoral marginality hypothesis, more
12
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recent analyses have challenged the theoretical basis of the marginality hypothesis and found no 
appreciable relationship and in many cases an inverse relationship between electoral margins and 
responsiveness.
In a study of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, MacRae (1952) was the first 
legislative scholar to propose and find empirical evidence of the electoral marginality hypothesis. 
MacRae observed legislators from marginal districts, apparently in response to their constituent's 
wishes, were found to be less loyal to party in their roll-call voting than were legislators from safe 
districts. Following MacRae’s study, several scholars replicated his findings across numerous 
state legislatures and found similar results that confirmed the electoral marginality hypothesis. (Dye 
1961; Patterson 1961; Shannon 1968)
Miller (1970) was the first to challenge the accepted electoral marginality theory. Based on 
his analysis of correlations between simulated constituent attitudes and representative roll call 
behavior. Miller concluded: "It is the marginal district Congressmen who virtually ignore what they 
think to be the district preferences in favor of their personal attitudes on policy questions -  and this 
by a spectacular margin.” (Miller 1970, 304)
Considering the strong but conflicting results of Miller’s (1970) research with that of the 
initial electoral marginality research, Fiorina (1973) attempted to address these conflicts. In his 
analysis of marginality research, Fiorina found that the initial electoral marginality research was 
generally flawed by a lack of constituency preference measures and the erroneous assumption that 
a congressman’s disloyalty to his party necessarily implied loyalty to his constituency. Fiorina 
concluded that Miller’s (1970) use of district preferences made his analysis the first study to directly 
test the marginality hypothesis and that ultimately, his findings were accurate.
Employing measures of district opinion and roll call behavior across three policy 
dimensions, Kuklinski (1977a) also directly tested the marginality hypothesis. Unlike Miller (1970), 
Kuklinski’s results failed to provide any conclusive answers. While Kuklinski found competitive 
congressional districts increased responsiveness on the dimension of taxation policy, he found little 
influence on the dimension of government administration and actually a negative influence on the 
general liberalism dimension.
13
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Sullivan and Uslaner (1978) provided and tested two alternative interpretations to the 
marginality hypothesis. Specifically, candidates from more marginal districts will: (1) tend to 
converge to the positions of their constituents; or (2) tend to converge to the positions of their 
opponents. Employing policy opinion data on candidates and simulated constituency opinion they 
found a general tendency for candidates to diverge from each other in marginal districts. More 
importantly, they found that candidates who are closest to the constituency opinion were 
considerably more likely to win than their opponent
In response to the numerous but inconclusive results found in analyses of the electoral 
marginality hypothesis, several scholars have questioned or rather challenged the traditional 
marginality hypothesis. In particularly, Kingdon (1981) has suggested that large electoral margins 
are actually the result of highly responsive legislators. He argues, constituents reward responsive 
legislators with large election margins. Consequently, he hypothesizes, large electoral margins will 
be positively related to responsiveness. Kingdon, however, is quick to point out that this is not 
necessarily a competing hypothesis. It is an additional hypothesis that responsiveness may lead to 
the presence of large electoral margins.
Erikson (1971), in his analysis of the electoral impact of congressional roll call voting, 
suggests an alternative measure of electoral threat Considering the hypothesis that congressional 
responsiveness and electoral threat is a two-way causal process, Erikson suggests that 
congressional election results are inadequate measures; as an alternative measure of electoral 
threat, he suggests utilizing district presidential voting. Erikson argues that the presidential vote, 
since it is unaffected by previous levels of congressional responsiveness, provides a more 
accurate measure of district partisanship or competitiveness. While Erikson makes a valid point, 
numerous scholars have argued that presidential election margins are not true measures of 
congressional electoral threat
Campbell (1981) argues the discrepancies found in the literature on electoral margins is 
partially due to an incorrect specification of marginality, and ultimately suggest that the relationship 
between district competitiveness and congressional responsiveness is not linear as assumed in
14
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previous analyses but rather curvilinear. Utilizing a nonlinear measure of electoral competition, 
Campbell finds that it has a significant impact on responsiveness.
Finally, more recent analyses by Bartels (1991) and Wink, Livingston, and Garand (1996) 
finds that legislators from marginal districts are more responsive to their constituents than 
legislators from safe districts. Specifically, Bartels finds the relationship between constituency 
opinion on defense spending and votes on a series of 1980’s defense budget roll calls are 
significantly stronger for members from marginal districts than those of safe districts. Similarly, 
Wink et al. find constituency opinion has a significantly stronger impact in marginal districts than in 
safe districts in an analysis of the votes for the North American Free Trade Agreement
RETIREMENT
Various legislative scholars have also considered the influence of the decision to retire on 
legislative responsiveness and behavior. (Hibbing 1984; Jackson and King 1989; Lott and Reed 
1989; Zupan 1990; Poole and Romer 1993; Herrick, Moore et al. 1994) The rational behind this 
line of research is that desire for re-election is the primary reason legislators are responsive to their 
constituents. Considering the fact that retiring congressmen are unconstrained by the desire to be 
reelected, it is hypothesized that congressmen who have chosen to retire will quite likely be less 
responsive to their constituents’ policy preferences than those colleagues who plan to run for 
reelection.
By comparing the behavior of congressmen who have chosen to run for reelection with 
that of congressmen who have decided no to do so, Hem'ck et al. find strong but indirect empirical 
support for this hypothesis. Specifically, Hem'ck et al. found that retiring congressmen employ less 
staff assistants, return to their districts less often, and are less concerned about roll-call voting.
In another analysis of the retirement hypothesis, Hibbing (1984) finds additional support for 
Herrick’s analysis. Specifically, his analysis finds that retiring congressmen are significantly less 
likely to support transfer payments to their districts than non-retiring members.
Lott and Reed (1989), however, have recently challenged the standard retirement 
hypothesis. They argue that the problem with the retirement hypothesis is that the legislators most 
likely to retire are legislators with higher than average seniority and this seniority is quite likely due
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to their responsiveness to constituent’s preferences. They go on to argue that political markets, 
given sufficient time, will sort out those politicians with policy preferences different from those of 
voters. Consequently, they conclude, if a congressman's own ideological preferences correspond 
with those of his constituents, the politician’s voting pattern should continue to reflect constituent 
preferences, even when the desire for reelection no longer exists. Their analysis of congressional 
roll call behavior supports their hypothesis.
Lott and Reed’s competing hypothesis is supported by a similar and more extensive 
analysis by Poole and Rosenthal (1997). They argue that the ideological voting patterns of 
congressmen are extremely stable, and their analysis finds the ideological voting patterns of 
retiring congressmen do not significantly change following their decisions to retire. Finally, Zupan 
(1990), in an analysis of the correlations between simulated constituent ideologies and 
congressional voting ideology, finds retiring congressmen are just as responsive as those
3
members who have not decided to retire.
ELECTORAL PROXIMITY
The first four years are for God and country. The last two are for the 
folks back home.
*
Senator Hubert Humphrey 
Term length and temporal proximity to the next election is also hypothesized to effect 
congressional representation in the U.S. Senate. Supporters of this hypothesis argue that the six- 
year election cycle allows U.S. Senators to vote their preferences in the first four years of their
term, then as reelection nears, their records move toward the preferences of their constituency.5
3
Zupan makes a poignant analogy regarding his analysis: “Much as academics may 
publish less in the years immediately after obtaining tenure even though they continue to publish at 
least as much as the average assistant professor, retiring members of the House appear to shirk 
their constituents’ interests more after deciding to retire even though the amount of shirking they 
undertake does not differ markedly from the amount of shirking undertaken by the average non- 
retiree." ^Zupan 1990, 177)
Quote from Elling. (1982, 75)
Ahuja (1994) argues that due to their much shorter terms, House members cannot afford 
to vacillate as such. They must constantly abide by the preferences of their constituents, since the 
need to secure reelection is always right around the comer.
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Amacher and Boyes (1978), Elling (1982), and Thomas (1985) in separate analyses 
examine the voting behavior of senators and find a clear “moderating” trend in their ideological 
positions as they approach reelections. As Amacher and Boyes (1978) conclude, Senators do 
indeed “behave independently when first elected and then become more representative as 
reelection approaches." (1978, 10) Hibbing’s analysis of senator's support for transfer payment 
legislation as they approach reelections also shows support for the proximity hypothesis. Finally, 
based on issue positions of senators and exit polls from states with Senate races in 1982, Wright 
and Berkman (1986) also find that incumbent senators “moderate later in their terms to increase 
their general election appeal." (1986, 575)
However, in a reanalysis of Wright and Berkman’s (1986) study Bernstein (1991) 
challenges the electoral proximity hypothesis. Based on his reanalysis of Wright’s data, Bernstein 
argues that “there is little support for the hypothesis that senators moderate their positions as 
reelection time approaches." (1991. 238) Instead, he concludes, “Impending elections encourage 
incumbent senators to shift towards the ideological preferences of the expected opposition, 
regardless of the preferences of their own constituencies.” (Bernstein 1991, 276) Hurley’s (1992) 
analysis of the 1988 Senate Election Study finds further support for Bernstein’s conclusions. 
According to Hurley, the electoral status of senators mattered only when voting on environmental 
policies. Finally. Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) recent and comprehensive analysis of senate roll- 
call votes also supports Bernstein’s conclusions. They find that the voting behavior of 
congressmen is remarkably stable and senators do not change the ideology of their roll call voting 
when up for reelection.
Sunil Ahuja (1994) provides the most recent and perhaps the most comprehensive 
analysis of the electoral proximity literature. According to Ahuja, the numerous analyses of the 
proximity hypothesis have provided congressional scholars with anything but conclusive results. In 
his review of this literature, Ahuja contributes the contradictory results of this research to the 
inconsistency in measuring changes in Senate voting and, more importantly, to inadequate 
measures of constituency preferences. Ahuja also notes that while most studies have simply 
focused on changes in Senate voting (Amacher and Boyes 1978; Elling 1982; Hibbing 1984;
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Thomas 1985; Poole and Rosenthal 1997), only a few have attempted to truly measure the 
responsiveness of legislators to their constituents. (Shapiro, Brady, Brody, and Ferejohn 1990; 
Wright and Berkman 1986)
Employing the American National Election Studies’ 1988 and 1990 Senate Election 
Studies, Ahuja finds significant support for the electoral proximity hypothesis. He finds U.S. 
Senators facing reelection in a particular year are considerably more responsive to their 
constituency’s preferences than those who are not up for reelection. Moreover, among the 
remaining two-thirds, those two years away from reelection display greater responsiveness to their 
constituency than those four years away. Therefore, he concludes, temporal proximity to election 
does matter in U.S. Senatorial voting behavior.
SENIORITY
Congressional seniority has also been hypothesized to influence the responsiveness of 
legislators. Sullivan and Uslaner (1978) provided one of the initial empirical analyses of the 
influence of seniority on congressional responsiveness. While their analysis found more senior 
congressmen were especially astute at discerning the policy preferences of their constituencies, 
they also found that the advantages of incumbency allowed senior congressmen to ignore those 
preferences. Stone (1979) also examined the seniority hypotheses in his analysis of House 
member's responsiveness to changes in constituent opinion on several issues. His results suggest 
House members behave habitually over time and consequently fail to respond to changes in district 
opinion. Stone argues, to the extent that responsiveness transpires, it is attributable primarily to 
turnover in congressional seats. Representation, he concludes, is the result of the initial 
recruitment process rather than a dynamic overtime response by the representative.
Hood and Moms (1998) find further support for this hypothesis. Their analysis of southern 
congressional districts from 1983 to 1992 suggests that the relationship between incumbents’ 
voting behavior and the ideological preferences of their districts often diverged over time and 
without resulting in defeat for the incumbents. Throughout the period of their analyses, they find, 
significantly more liberal Democrats consistently replaced incumbent Democrats in the South.
18
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Replacement, however, rarely resulted from electoral defeat of the incumbent, but was rather the 
result of death, retirement or resignation.
Finally, Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) historical analysis of roll call voting provides 
additional support of the seniority hypothesis. As noted previously, Poole and Rosenthal find the 
voting patterns of congressmen are extremely stable. They contend that contemporary members 
of Congress enter with a set ideological position and sustain that position until they die, retire, or 
are defeated.
Despite the abundant evidence supporting the hypothesis that senior congressmen can 
and do ignore the preferences of their constituents, a small number of scholars have argued that 
senior congressmen are actually more responsive to the preferences of their constituents. (Glazer 
and Robbins 1985; Lott and Reed 1989; Zupan 1990; Lott and Davis 1992) In particular, Glazer 
and Robbins (1985) argue that more seasoned legislators owe their seniority to an ability to sense 
and react to changes in constituency preferences. Utilizing the natural experiment of redistricting 
to measure how much congressmen adjust their positions when the prevailing preferences in their 
districts change, Glazer and Robins found that responsiveness was higher among congressmen 
who won reelection than among those not returned to office and greater among senior 
congressman than among junior congressman. Lott and Reed (1989), Lott and Davis (1992) and 
Zupan (1990) also support this argument in their research. Specifically. Lott and Reed contend, 
“political markets eventually sort out those politicians who fail to accurately represent their 
constituencies’ preferences." (1989, 75) However, he does accept that temporary 
misrepresentation may occur, depending on how quickly sorting takes place.
ROLE ORIENTATION
Legislator role orientation is the final factor or characteristic of legislators that has been 
hypothesized to influence their responsiveness to constituent preferences. Specifically, McCrone 
and Kuklinski (1979) argue that responsiveness is more likely to occur with legislators who think of 
themselves as delegates. Their unique analysis, which utilizes interviews with nearly forty 
incumbent California state legislators, provides strong support for their hypothesis. Unfortunately, 
replication of their study is impractical if not infeasible due to the necessity of measures of
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legislative role orientations that are not readily available for state legislators or U.S. Congressmen. 
An additional problem with their analysis, noted by Alpert (1979), is the fact that legislative role 
orientations may actually be the result of the level of responsiveness of legislators rather than the 
cause.
INFLUENCE OF CONSTITUENT CONDITIONS ON REPRESENTATION
Representation is a complex process of interaction between 
representatives and represented; to ignore one of the actors is to do 
injustice to this complexity, and thus to the representative process itself.
McCrone and Kuklinski (1979, 299)
Despite the consequences for representation that are likely to occur from variation in 
constituency population and despite the inherent importance of representation in democratic 
political systems, existing research does not provide much guidance on the topic in terms of either 
theory or empirical findings. As suggested above, a substantial body of research on congressional 
representation has focused on the effects of various legislator conditions on the level of 
representation constituents receive. Unfortunately, only a small number of scholars have 
examined the effects of various constituent conditions on congressional representation.
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT/SOPHISTICATION
Tne political engagement or rather sophistication of constituents in a district has also been 
hypothesized to influence how legislators translate constituency policy preferences into roll-call 
votes. (Fenno 1978; Jackson and King 1989; Kingdon 1989) This hypothesis is based on the idea 
that constituencies with high levels of political engagement are more likely to be aware of the policy 
positions taken by their legislator’s and, most importantly are more likely to make their legislators 
accountable for their actions.
Jackson and King (1989) and Ardoin and Garand (1996) provide the only empirical 
analyses of the political engagement hypothesis. Jackson and King’s (1989) analysis of House 
member’s roll call voting decisions on the 1978 Tax Reform Act finds the political engagement of 
constituents in a political district does not have a significant influence on the responsiveness of 
legislators. However, Ardoin and Garand’s (1996) comprehensive analysis of representation in the
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U.S. Senate from 1976 through 1992 finds significant support for the political engagement 
hypothesis. Specifically, representation of state constituent ideology in senate roll call behavior 
increases significantly as the political engagement of state’s constituency increases.
HETEROGENEITY AND REPRESENTATION
The theoretical rationale underlying the heterogeneity hypothesis is simple and was 
originally put forth by Ardoin and Garand (1996). Arguably, homogeneous districts will have 
constituencies that have relatively homogeneous interests, at least in comparison to 
heterogeneous districts. Confronted with relatively clear signals from their constituents, legislators 
are hard pressed to deviate from the policy preferences of their constituents, lest they subject 
themselves to an enhanced threat of electoral defeat in subsequent elections. Conversely, 
heterogeneous constituencies are more likely to convey conflicting and ambiguous signals to their 
representatives than homogeneous constituencies. The complexity of policy signals emanating 
from diverse districts leaves legislators with few tangible constituency messages with which to 
make roll-call decisions. Consequently, it is hypothesized that the linkage between constituency 
opinion and legislative roll-call behavior should be stronger for legislators representing 
homogeneous districts. In heterogeneous districts the linkage between constituency opinion and 
legislative roll-call behavior is hypothesized to be weakened by the inconsistent and conflicting 
signals received by the representative.
Research on the influence of constituent heterogeneity on congressional responsiveness 
has generally provided support for this hypothesis. For instance, Ardoin and Garand (1996) find 
senators from homogeneous states are significantly more responsive to the policy preferences of 
their constituents than are senators from heterogeneous states. More specifically, they find when 
homogeneous constituencies generate clear policy signals, senators strongly link their roll-call 
behavior to constituency preferences. However, when constituency policy preferences are 
muddled by diverse constituencies, the representational task confronting senators becomes more 
difficult, and the linkage between constituency preferences and roll-call behavior is diluted. They 
ultimately conclude that U.S. senators vary their responsiveness to the ideological preferences of 
their constituents as a function of the clarity of signals coming from those constituents.
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Additional support of the influence of constituent heterogeneity is found in the work of
Wright (1978) who finds representatives from heterogeneous districts are less responsive to the
general constituency of their district and more responsive to their partisans. This conclusion by
Wright is also supported by the work of Goff and Grier (1993) who find increases in the differences
between same state senators’ ADA scores are strongly related to increases in constituent
heterogeneity. These results indicate citizens living in heterogeneous states may only be
6
represented by the senator of their partisan affiliation.
Bailey and Brady’s (1998) analysis of recent Senate votes on free trade also provide 
strong support for the hypothesis that constituent heterogeneity influences congressional 
responsiveness. They find constituency variables related to support for free trade fit senate voting 
patterns much more clearly for senators from homogeneous states than for senators from 
heterogeneous states. Finally, Anderson and Roscoe (1998), who employ the level of ticket 
splitting in a district as a measure of the heterogeneity of constituent preferences, find political 
heterogeneity is closely associated with misrepresentation of constituent preferences.
While the influence of constituent heterogeneity on representation has been recognized, 
the bulk of research regarding constituent heterogeneity has actually focused on its effects upon 
electoral competition. Particularly, scholars have hypothesized; electoral competition will increase 
as the level of constituent heterogeneity increases. This hypothesis is strongly based on the simple 
idea that in homogeneous districts, constituency opinion is skewed to the left or right of center or 
single peaked which leads to strong electoral advantages for either the Democratic or Republican 
party, while constituency opinion in heterogeneous constituencies is rather evenly distributed or 




Herrick and Thomas’ (1993) analysis of split delegations in the United States Senate 
from 1920-1988 also reinforce this conclusion. Specifically, they find constituent heterogeneity is 
positively related to split delegations. That is, the higher the level of heterogeneity, the higher 
likelihood there will be for the state to have a split senate delegation.
Fiorina makes the argument that congressmen from heterogeneous districts will be 
moderate in their roll call behavior, considering their need to attract a wide ideological spectrum of 
voters (1974).
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Empirical analyses that have attempted to confirm and quantify the influence of 
heterogeneity on electoral competition have, until recently, been mixed at best Specifically, initial 
investigations of the hypothesis that constituent heterogeneity increases electoral competition 
provided minimal supporting evidence. (Froman 1963; Fiorina 1974; Bond 1983)
Two studies conducted by Fiorina (1974) and Bond (1983) illustrate the confusion in the 
literature. Fiorina’s (1974) analysis of the U.S. Senate demonstrated that the heterogeneity of a 
state did significantly affect the levels of electoral competition experienced within them. However, 
his results show that this relationship varied between the South and non-South. In the South, 
Fiorina found that heterogeneity increased the competitiveness of Senate races, as the hypothesis 
suggest However, for the non-South, Fiorina found that increased constituent heterogeneity led to 
larger margins of victory -  directly contrary to the hypothesis. Moreover, Bond’s (1983) analysis of 
the relationship between constituent heterogeneity and electoral competition in U.S. House races 
also provides weak results. Bond examined the U.S. House races during the 1970s and found no 
significant relationship between diversity and electoral competition. Finally, Hibbing and Brandes 
(1983), who employ population size as a surrogate measure of constituent heterogeneity, find that 
that senate races in heavily populated (heterogeneous) states are significantly more competitive 
than the senate races in less populated (homogeneous) states.
William Koetzle (1998; 1997) in his more recent and comprehensive analyses of the 
impact of constituent heterogeneity on electoral competition, argues that much of the confusion in 
this literature is due to the dependence on the Sullivan index as a measure of political diversity. 
The Sullivan index, Koetzle argues, is a measure of absolute, not political diversity of a 
constituency. After developing a new and improved measure of political diversity, he clearly 
demonstrates that heterogeneous districts experience significantly more electoral competition than 
homogeneous districts in U.S. House elections (see chapter 4 for a comprehensive discussion of 
Koetzle's measure of constituent heterogeneity).
In summary, while there has been a considerable amount of research regarding constituent 
heterogeneity, the majority of this work has focused on the influence of heterogeneity on 
congressional competition rather than congressional representation. The limited numbers of
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studies examining the influence of constituent heterogeneity on congressional representation, 
however, have found strong evidence in support of the heterogeneity hypothesis. Ardoin and 
Garand (1996), Wright (1978) and Bailey and Brady (1988) all find evidence that the complexity of 
policy signals conveyed from heterogeneous districts makes congressional representation more 
difficult and less likely.
CONFLICT AND INCONSISTENCY
As exhibited in the preceding sections, inconsistencies and conflict best describe the state 
of research on legislative representation. While there has been a plethora of empirical research 
over the past 36 years examining the factors that influence congressional representation, it seems 
we know little more than we did in 1963 after the publication of Miller and Stokes original work.
As noted above, difficulties in measuring constituent preferences have contributed 
significantly to the inconsistent and contradictory results of previous research; however, incomplete 
models and difference in study design and conceptualization has also played an important part
Differences in study design and conceptualization are perhaps most evident in the 
extensive electoral marginality literature. While several prominent scholars have weighed in on the 
debate regarding the influence of electoral margins, congressional scholars can agree on little with 
regard to this hypothesis.
Original research on the influence of electoral margins mistakenly assumed legislator’s 
disloyalty to their party implied loyalty to their constituency. While more recent work has realized 
the flaw in this assumption, scholars now argue whether marginal congressmen will be responsive 
to their partisans, become more moderate, or move in the ideological direction of their potential 
opponents. Finally, some scholars have even argued over how we should actually measure 
electoral margins. Erikson (1971) argues that congressional election results are inadequate 
measures and suggests employing district presidential votes, while Campbell (1981) suggests the 
use of a nonlinear measure of electoral competition.
Another significant reason for the inconsistent findings of congressional representation 
research is the fact that throughout the literature legislative scholars have consistently failed to test 
a single model of congressional representation. While numerous scholars have examined
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individual factors or combinations of factors hypothesized to influence congressional
representation, none have considered the full range of factors hypothesized to affect the
relationship between constituency opinion and roll call behavior. Scholars often limit their analysis
to one or two legislator or constituent conditions that are key to the focus of their analysis and
ignore additional factors known to influence representation. Unfortunately, as noted by Lewis-Beck
(1980), the exclusion of relevant variables in a model will produce specification enors and lead to 
8
biased estimators. (Lewis-Beck 1980; Berry and Feldman 1985)
8
For a more detailed discussion of the effects of model misspecification see William D. 
Berry and Stanley Feldman, Multiple Regression in Practice, pages 18-26.
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CHAPTER 3: SOURCES OF VARIATION IN CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSIVENESS
What explains variation in the responsiveness of legislators to the policy preferences of 
their constituents? As discussed above, scholars have hypothesized that legislative 
responsiveness will vary as a function of characteristics of both legislators and their constituencies. 
Particularly, they suggest that policy congruence in roll call behavior is a function of at least three 
core concepts: (1) electoral threat, (2) constituency political engagement; and (3) clarity of policy 
signals emanating from legislators' constituencies.
In this chapter, I present and develop several hypotheses that explain variation in 
congressional responsiveness. This chapter begins with a discussion of what influence the desire 
for reelection has on legislative responsiveness. First, I discuss the impact of competitive elections 
and argue that electorally competitive districts induce legislators to be more responsive to their 
constituents. Next, I consider the affect the decision to retire has on congressional responsiveness 
and hypothesize that congressmen unconstrained by the desire to be reelected will generally be 
less responsive to the preferences of their constituents. Finally, I examine the influence of six-year 
terms on Senate responsiveness and hypothesize that the relationship between constituent 
preferences and senate voting behavior will be stronger for senators facing reelection than those 
who are not up for reelection.
Next, I examine the influence of congressional seniority on responsiveness. I consider 
whether the advantages of incumbency insulate congressmen from the threat of electoral defeat 
and allow even un-responsive legislators to be reelected or whether congressional seniority is 
actually the result of legislators being responsive.
After discussing the influence of various legislator conditions, I consider the influence of 
constituent conditions on congressional responsiveness. First, I examine the influence of a 
politically engaged constituency on the level of congressional responsiveness. Considering that 
engaged constituents are more likely to make their preferences known and to hold members 
responsible if they do not respect those preferences, I suggest that legislators are more responsive 
to constituencies that are politically engaged. Next, I examine the influence of constituent
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heterogeneity on levels of congressional responsiveness. I hypothesize that homogeneous 
constituencies send relatively clear signals to their legislators and therefore these legislators are 
hard pressed to deviate from the policy preferences of their constituencies. Heterogeneous 
constituencies, however, are more likely to send conflicting signals to their legislators; therefore, 
these legislators are left with relatively few tangible cues on how to make their roll call decisions.
VARIATION IN CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIVENESS
Before we begin the discussion of the sources hypothesized to explain variation in 
congressional responsiveness, we must ask a simple question: Why should members of Congress 
vary in their level of responsiveness?
According to Fenno (1973), members of Congress are goal directed. He contends that the 
three most widely held and significant goals of congressmen are: (1) re-election, (2) influence 
within the House, and (3) good public policy. Considering these three basic goals of congressmen 
and assuming members of congress act rationally, several hypotheses can be developed 
regarding the responsiveness of members of congress to their constituents.
For example, consider two hypothetical members of congress: Member A is from a very 
competitive district while member B is from a non-competitive district Both members desire 
reelection, but the reelection prospects of Member A are more tenuous than those of Member B. 
Member A may perceive that she can improve her electoral prospects by more closely linking her 
roll-call behavior to the policy preferences of her constituency. By doing so, she brings her roll-call 
behavior more in line with the positions advocated by the voters in her district When it comes time 
for citizens to cast their votes, they will be more likely to support Member A because of her high 
level of responsiveness. On the other hand. Member B represents a safe district The safety of 
Member B’s district allows him to deviate from the preferred position of his district's voters without 
seriously jeopardizing his electoral prospects in the next election. Because of the electoral safety 
of his district, Member B is not concerned whether he loses the support of a few voters in the next 
election for deviating from the preferred policy positions of his district’s voters. What we can 
observe here is that a characteristic of members’ districts —  i.e., electoral threat —  will move one
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member (Member A) toward greater responsiveness but will give another member (Member B) 
greater latitude to pursue his only policy agenda.
The point is that there are a variety of constituency and member characteristics that will 
promote or diminish congressional responsiveness. My example above deals with electoral threat, 
but other characteristics, such as seniority, other aspects of electoral threat district political 
engagement and constituent heterogeneity will result in variation in how rational legislators will 
respond to their constituents.
ELECTORAL THREAT
Among the variables suggested to influence the relationship between constituency 
preferences and legislative roll-call behavior, electoral threat has undoubtedly received the most
9
attention. As noted above, this is not surprising, considering the idea that elections are at the core 
of the representative process and are expected to keep congressmen in line and responsive. 
Elections, as democratic theorists argue, are the collective control voters hold that guarantees a 
high level of legislative responsiveness. The following section addresses three basic factors 
associated with electoral threat (1) marginal elections, (2) member’s decision to retire, and (3) 
proximity to their next bid for reelection.
Marginal Elections
The theoretical underpinnings of the electoral marginality hypothesis seem to be quite 
reasonable. Reelection is the dominant goal pursued by legislators (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974) 
and voters have the opportunity to deny reelection to their representatives. In theory, this power 
prompts legislators to provide their constituents with goods (e.g., congruent policy behavior, 
constituency service, pork-barrel projects, etc.) that placate constituents' concerns and increase 
the likelihood that voters will return them to office. Given that a representative's primary goal is re- 
election, marginal representatives should be more responsive to their constituents in an effort to
9
Fiorina maintains that the electoral threat thesis “is so well accepted that many 
undergraduate students probably learn it as part of the corpus of knowledge about the legislative 
process” (Fiorina 1973).
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diminish their electoral uncertainty. In practical terms, of course, not all constituencies subject 
legislators to the same level of electoral threat
Incumbents who win elections by large margins can be seen as being relatively insulated
from subsequent electoral defeat and, hence, less obliged to follow the policy views of their 
10
constituents. Some legislators may be fortunate to represent districts with strong partisan
attachments that habitually elect a representative of the same party, and these partisan 
attachments may insulate incumbents representing the dominant party from electoral defeat except 
in the rarest of circumstances. More specifically, for a Democratic (Republican) legislator in a 
highly Democratic (Republican) district, the threat of electoral defeat may not be very tangible, but 
legislators representing competitive partisan districts must be more responsive to the policy 
demands of their districts, since their party label will not assure their reelection.
Ultimately, all legislators understand that their constituency controls their reelection. After 
all, what the district gives the district can take away. Legislators representing competitive districts 
must be responsive to the policy demands of their districts if they expect the district to continue to 
provide their electoral support
H,: The relationship between constituent preferences and congressional 
voting behavior will increase as the level of district electoral 
competitiveness increases.
Retirement
A congressman’s decision not to seek reelection and retire is also hypothesized by many 
legislative scholars to influence congressional responsiveness. The logic behind this hypothesis is 
straightforward. According to Schlesinger (1966), the desire for election, and for reelection is the 
electorate's primary restraint upon legislators. He continues that “no more irresponsible
10
There is actually some debate concerning the degree to which electoral safety in one 
election insulates incumbents from electoral defeat in subsequent elections (Jacobson 1987). The 
linkage between vote margins in adjacent elections has important implications for the marginality 
hypothesis. If large vote margins virtually guarantee an incumbent reelection in subsequent 
elections, then those incumbents winning with a large percentage of the vote need not be as 
responsive to the views of their constituents. On the other hand, if large vote margins are not 
strongly related to prospects for victory in subsequent elections, legislators should be motivated to
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government is imaginable than one of high-minded men unconcerned for their political fortunes." 
(1966. 2) In this traditional view, it is the desire for reelection that forces legislators to be 
responsive to constituents and from running off in dangerous directions.
Considering the fact that retiring congressmen are unconstrained by the desire to be 
reelected, it is hypothesized that congressmen who have chosen to retire will quite likely be less 
responsive to their constituent’s policy preferences when compared to colleagues who plan to run 
for reelection. After all, would legislators be receptive to constituent input if they were not worried 
about the performance in the next election?
Lott and Reed (1989), however, have recently challenged this traditional retirement 
hypothesis. They argue that the problem with the retirement hypothesis is that the legislators most 
likely to retire are legislators with higher than average seniority and this seniority is quite likely due 
to their responsiveness to their constituent’s preferences. They go on to argue that political 
markets, given sufficient time, will sort out those politicians with policy preferences different from 
their constituents. Consequently, they conclude, if a congressman’s own ideological preferences 
correspond with those of his constituents, the politician’s voting pattern should continue to reflect 
constituent preferences, even when the desire for reelection no longer exists. Lott and Reed do 
make a valid argument although the process that they depict suggests principally that seniority is 
related to enhanced responsiveness, and not retirement per se. However, given that I am 
controlling for the effects of seniority in my multivariate analysis, my coefficients for the retirement 
variable are independent of the effects of seniority.
Ultimately, I argue that the rational behind the retirement hypothesis is quite sound. The 
desire for reelection is the primary reason many members of congress are responsive to their 
constituents. Considering the fact that retiring members of congress are unconstrained by the 
desire to be reelected again, congressmen who have chosen to retire will quite likely be less 
responsive to their constituent’s policy preferences than those colleagues who plan to run for 
reelection.
link their roll-call behavior to the policy preferences of their constituents in order to avoid vengeful 
voters and improve their electoral prospects.
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H2: The decision to retire from congress will weaken the relationship 
between constituent preferences and congressional voting 
behavior. Retiring congressmen are not constrained by the desire 
to be reelected and will vote their own preferences rather than the 
preferences of their constituents.
Electoral Proximity
Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which 
government dependence on, and sympathy with, the people can be 
effectually secured.
James Madison (Federalist #52)
Term length and temporal proximity to the next election is also hypothesized to effect 
congressional representation. In The Federalist Papers Madison reasoned that the Senate 
“ought..to possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of 
considerable duration" so it would not be subject to the “impulse of sudden and violent passions." 
Like Madison, supporters of the electoral proximity hypothesis argue that the six-year election cycle 
allows U.S. Senators to vote their preferences in the first four years of their term, and then as
it
reelection nears, their records move toward the preferences of their constituency.
The electoral proximity hypothesis is based on the idea that electoral pressures are felt 
more intensely when an election is imminent Therefore, it is argued that activities thought to 
improve the chances of winning peak shortly before elections. Senators believe, come Election 
Day, their recent votes are the ones most likely to be remembered by their constituents. This logic 
is based on two thoughts. The more obvious of which is that how recent an event and in this case 
a Senator's vote, occurred is strongly correlated with one's ability to remember it The second is 
that potential voters are likely to be more attentive during a senator's reelection campaign when 
their voting decision is close at hand and when interest in politics and the voting behavior of
11
Hibbing (1983) addresses the reason that the electoral proximity hypothesis is limited to 
Senate analysis. He notes that the U.S. House of Representatives two-year election cycle does 
not provide its members an opportunity to engage in widely vacillating cyclical activity, since every 
year must be treated as an election year. “It is unlikely a representative under extreme electoral 
pressure would forget his constituents for one year and then suddenly become a believer in the 
electoral rewards of a voting record that demonstrates responsiveness. But in the Senate the six- 
year term does provide the opportunity for members to engage in real behavioral cycles.”
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12
members of congress, generally, is heightened. (Thomas 1985) Considering the logic behind this 
argument I make the following hypothesis:
H3: The relationship between constituent preferences and U.S. Senate 
voting behavior will be stronger for Senators feeing reelection than 
those who are not up for reelection.
SENIORITY
Congressional seniority has also been hypothesized to influence the responsiveness of 
legislators. Considering that most incumbents are extremely stable in their roll-call behavior and 
quite slow to respond to the regular changes in their constituents sentiments, legislative scholars 
contend that the greater an incumbent’s seniority the greater the chance of differences between 
constituent’s sentiment and incumbent roll call behavior. Although democratic elections “should" 
control this problem, it is argued that the advantages of incumbency (name recognition, campaign 
resources, and the ability to deliver pork barrel projects) unfortunately insulate legislators from 
electoral reprisal. This insulation may be so thick that it may allow even unresponsive members to 
be reelected (even when the challenger is closer to their constituent’s preferences).
Despite the abundant evidence supporting the hypothesis that senior congressmen can 
and do ignore the preferences of their constituents, a small number of scholars have argued that 
more senior congressmen are actually more responsive to the preferences of their constituents. 
(Ardoin and Garand, 1996; Glazer and Robbins 1985; Lott and Davis 1992; Lott and Reed 1989; 
Zupan 1990) In particular, Glazer and Robbins (1985) argue more seasoned legislators owe their 
seniority to their ability to sense and react to changes in constituency preferences. Lott (1992; 
1989) and Zupan (1990) also support this argument in their research. Specifically, Lott contends, 
“political markets eventually sort out those politicians who fail to accurately represent their 
constituencies’ preferences." (1989, 75) However, he does accept that temporary 
misrepresentation may occur, depending on how quickly sorting takes place. Finally, Ardoin and
12
Whether this temporal vanation in constituent recollection really exists is actually less 
relevant to the hypothesis than whether U.S. Senators believe that it exists. Despite the prevailing 
evidence that the majority of citizens are politically apathetic or ignorant, interviews with legislators 
suggest they believe that their voters will judge them on how they behave legislatively.
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Garand (1996) contend that as members gain seniority they also gain experience and a better 
understanding of howto represent their constituents.
Considering the conflicting yet equally sound hypotheses provided by previous scholars, I 
put forward to hypotheses regarding the influence of seniority on levels of congressional 
responsiveness.
H4a: The relationship between constituent preferences and
congressional voting behavior will decline as congressional 
seniority increases. (Senior members of Congress are not 
responsive to the ideological changes in their district but the 
advantages of incumbency insulate them from defeat from 
challengers who would be more responsive.)
H4b: The relationship between constituent preferences and
congressional voting behavior will increases as congressional 
seniority increases. (Congressional seniority is the result of 
members of Congress being responsive to their constituents' 
preferences.)
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT/SOPHISTICATION
The political engagement or rather sophistication of constituents in a district has been 
hypothesized to influence levels of congressional responsiveness. (Fenno 1978; Jackson and King 
1989; Kingdon 1989) This hypothesis is based on the logic that constituencies with high levels of 
political engagement (as reflected by high levels of education and political participation) are more 
likely to be aware of the policy positions taken by their representatives and to hold those 
representatives accountable for their actions. On the other hand, in those districts in which citizens 
are characterized as having low levels of political engagement, legislators are less constrained in 
their policy behavior, since their constituents are less likely to be aware of their roll-call behavior in 
the first place, to hold strong policy views on many issues, and to participate on election day and 
punish them for failing to follow their preferences. In essence, legislators in such districts can act 
with relative impunity, since it is less likely that there will be adverse consequences associated with 
their actions.
Hs: The relationship between constituent preferences and congressional 
voting behavior will increase as the level of constituent political 
sophistication increases.
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HETEROGENEITY AND REPRESENTATION
Of the constituent conditions hypothesized to influence congressional responsiveness, the 
political heterogeneity or diversity of constituents in a district has by far received the greatest 
amount of attention from representation scholars. Scholars have long asserted that the 
heterogeneity or diversity of a constituency (the mix of demographic, social, and economic traits
that define them) should influence the political behavior observed within them.13 The basic 
hypothesis of this line of research is that legislators from homogeneous districts will be more 
responsive to their general constituency than legislators from heterogeneous districts. If it is true 
that certain demographic, social, and economic characteristics are strongly associated with support 
for ideologies of the left or right, then the presence of a dominant set of characteristics associated 
with one ideology (i.e. demographic homogeneity) has significant implications for the distribution of 
political preferences within such a constituency; and this, in turn, will significantly impact political
1415
responsiveness within such a constituency.
The affect of certain demographic groups upon the distribution of opinion within a 
constituency and, thus, the political behavior observed within them is implicit in much of the work 
proposing spatial models of elections and voting behavior. Anthony Downs' seminal work. An 
Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), is an excellent example.
There is a large body of empirical evidence that ideological and partisan identification is 
closely tied to demographic groups. It has been noted by a number of scholars and vividly 
displayed in this work (see state ideology model) that lower socio-economic groups, blue collar 
workers, minority, ethnic, and religious groups, and urban voters identify closely with the 
Democrats; while Republicans receive their largest support from higher socio-economic groups, 
white collar workers, whites, protestants, and suburban voters (Berelson, Lazarsfeld et al. 1954; 
Mayer 19|6; Cain and MacDonald 1997; Koetzle 1997).
Elected representatives recognize the importance of socio-demographic characteristics 
as well. Congresspersons themselves often view and describe their constituencies in terms of 
heterogeneity and various socio-demographic characteristics. Consider the comments of 
“Congressman E” in Richard Fenno’s classic work, Homestyle: House Members in their District 
(1978): “We are geographically southern and politically northern. We have agriculture — mostly 
soybeans and com. We have big business like Union Carbide and General Electric. And we have 
unions. We have a city and we have small towns. We have some of the worst poverty in the 
country in Delta County. And we have some very wealthy sections, though not large. We have 
wealth in the city and some wealthy towns. W e have urban poverty and rural poverty. Just about 
the only thing we don’t have is a good-sized ghetto. Otherwise, everything you can have we’ve got 
it right here (1978:102).” Moreover, Fenno notes: “Not all members spontaneously characterize 
their districts using the language of homogeneity or heterogeneity. But only one, when queried, 
was uncomfortable with the distinction. Because it is a summary variable and because it seems to 
have perceptual meaning and political consequences, it has proven especially useful (1978:5).”
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The theoretical rationale underlying the heterogeneity hypothesis is simple. Arguably, 
homogeneous districts will have constituencies that have relatively homogeneous interests, at least 
in comparison to heterogeneous districts. When relatively homogeneous constituencies convey 
their interests to their elected representatives, those representatives receive relatively clear signals 
about what is expected of them. In essence, consistency of constituency cues is at least partially a 
function of congruent interests. Confronted with relatively clear signals from their constituents, 
legislators are hard pressed to deviate from the policy preferences of their constituents, lest they 
subject themselves to an enhanced threat of electoral defeat in subsequent elections. Conversely, 
heterogeneous constituencies are more likely to convey conflicting and ambiguous signals to their 
representatives than homogeneous constituencies. When diverse populations with diverse 
interests occupy legislative districts, the signals transmitted to legislators become more complex 
and difficult to interpret The perplexity of policy signals emanating from diverse districts leaves 
legislators with few tangible constituency messages with which to make roll-call decisions. 
Consequently, legislators from these districts may opt to respond to the preferences of only a 
limited group of constituents (most likely their partisans or reelection constituency). Ultimately, this 
means that the linkage between gernal constituent opinion and legislative roll-call behavior should 
be stronger for legislators representing homogeneous districts, and in heterogeneous districts, the 
linkage between general constituent opinion and legislative roll-call behavior should be weakened 
by the inconsistent and conflicting signals received by the representative.
As a vivid example of the influence of constituency heterogeneity on congressional 
representation, we can compare two congressional districts of the 106“’ Congress. The 5th 
Congressional District of South Carolina is an example of the quintessential heterogeneous 
constituency, while the 11th Congressional District of New York provides an example of the 
prototypical homogeneous constituency.
The 11th Congressional District of New York represented since 1982 by Major Owens is 
located in Brooklyn, NY and covers only 10 square miles. This district supported Bill Clinton with 
nearly 90% of the vote in 1992 and 1996, 81% of the residents are minorities, 60% have less than 
a high school education, and 80% of the registered voters are Democrats. Considering the
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demographics of this district, it is safe to assume that it is a solid Democratic district with 
consistently liberal ideological preferences. Consequently, Congressman Owen’s voting decisions 
for the past 17 years have been quite simple, vote with the preferences of his districts 
overwhelming liberal majority.
While the 11m District of New York is rather homogeneous and most likely provides 
Congressman Owen with a consistent pattern of voting cues, the 5th Congressional District of 
South Carolina, represented since 1982 by John Spratt, is the quintessential heterogeneous 
district The 5th Congressional District borders four distinct regions of South Carolina and covers 
6830 square miles. This district (1) has evenly divided its votes for the Democratic and Republican 
candidates in the last two presidential elections, (2) has a significant number of minority 
constituents (33%), but not a majority and (3) is populated with a nearly even division of old-south 
farmers, blue-color workers, and white collar workers. Considering the demographic make-up of 
this district, it is safe to assume the cues sent from it are anything but consistent Even if 
Congressman Spratt is particularly sensitive to preferences of his district he will be relatively 
unsuccessful in achieving concordance with the district as a whole. Congressman Spratt faces the 
nearly impossible task of pleasing the conflicting interests of a heterogeneous constituency.
The rational for the district heterogeneity hypothesis is also displayed graphically in Figure 
3.1 with District 1 representing the ideological distribution of a homogeneous congressional district 
and District 2 representing the ideological distribution of a heterogeneous congressional district 
The ideological distribution in the homogeneous district is single peaked or rather unimodal, 
consequently the voting decisions for this district’s congressman are quite easy, vote the 
preferences of the overwhelming majority. In the heterogeneous district, the ideological distribution 
has multiple peaks. Therefore, the representative’s voting decision is not easy. The representative 
from this heterogeneous district feces the nearly impossible task of trying to please conflicting 
preferences.
Finally, Fiorina (1974) asserts, constituency homogeneity should also increase the 
chances that the representative will have many of the same opinions as the bulk of his or her
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16constituents. As an example consider again the two homogeneous and heterogeneous districts 
discussed above. If one were to randomly select 10 individuals from the 11m Congressional District 
of New York, the odds are quite high that a majority would be solid liberals with political views 
similar to Congressman Owen and the rest of the constituents of the 111,1 Congressional District 
Conversely, 10 randomly selecting individuals from the 5th Congressional District of South Carolina 
would most likely provide a wide variety of political ideologies. Obviously, homogenous districts are 
much more likely to select members of congress with similar preferences to the majority of the 
district Therefore, even when members from homogenous districts vote their own preferences 
they will quite likely vote in line with the preferences of the majority in their district
H6: The relationship between constituent preferences and congressional 
voting behavior will decrease as the level of constituent political 
heterogeneity increases.
SUMMARY
In summary, I hypothesize that legislative responsiveness will vary as a function of various 
legislator and district characteristics. Specifically, I suggest that policy congruence in roll-call 
behavior is a function of at least three core concepts: (1), electoral threat (2) constituency political 
engagement and (3) district heterogeneity or rather the clarity of policy signals emanating from 
legislators' constituencies.
Policy responsiveness should be greatest when constituencies send clear signals about 
the policy positions that they expect their representatives to take, when legislators perceive that 
they are vulnerable to subsequent electoral defeat, and when constituents are engaged in and 
knowledgeable about politics. On the other hand, policy responsiveness should be weakest when 
constituencies send complex and or conflicting signals about their preferred policy positions, when
This assertion is illustrated in Fenno’s Homestyle in a poignant comment by 
“Congressman C": A Congressman who comes from a homogeneous district like mine will vote the 
way his district wants most of the time because he’s so much like them”(Fenno 1978:142)
38
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legislators do not perceive an electoral threat and when constituents are unconcerned or unaware 
of the actions of their politicians.
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODS
Thus far, I have laid out the theoretical arguments explaining variation in congressional 
roll-call responsiveness across members and constituency contexts. In order to assess the 
empirical support for my hypotheses, it is necessary to have measures of congressional roll call 
ideology, constituent ideology, electoral threat congressional retirement congressional seniority, 
constituent political engagement and constituent heterogeneity. Unfortunately, political scientists 
do not have direct measures of many of these variables and consequently indirect or surrogate 
measures are necessary to measure their influence on congressional responsiveness.
In this chapter, I discuss how I measure each of these variables in my analysis of 
congressional responsiveness. I begin with a discussion of the dependent variable in the model, 
member roll call ideology. While scholars typically employ standard interest group scores to 
measure member roll call ideology, I employ Poole and Rosenthal’s (1991) D-Nominate scores. D- 
Nominate scores are selected over the traditional interest group scores because of biases in the 
selection of interest group scores and the inability to compare interest group scores across 
congresses. Next I discuss the most significant and challenging variable of my model, constituent 
ideology. For the analysis of Senate responsiveness. I employ Wright, Erikson, and Mclver’s 
(1993) robust measures of state ideology. Unfortunately, reliable measures of House constituent 
ideology are not readily available, and the alternative measures employed by previous scholars 
have serious flaws. Consequently, I develop a new and improved method of simulating House 
constituent ideology that I argue produces more reliable and accurate measures of the concept I 
then address the relatively direct measures of member characteristics, which include electoral 
threat, congressional retirement congressional seniority, and electoral proximity. Finally, I discuss 
the challenges of measuring the constituent factors hypothesized to influence congressional 
responsiveness, constituent political engagement and constituent heterogeneity. While no direct 
measure of constituent political engagement is readily available, I argue that the proportion of 
college graduates in each state or district performs as a quite reliable measure of constituent 
political engagement I then conclude the chapter with a review of the measures of constituent 
heterogeneity used in previous research. Considering the weaknesses of these measures, I argue
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that an improved measure recently developed by William Koetzle (1998) provides the most 
appropriate and reliable measure of constituent political heterogeneity.
MEASURES OF ROLL CALL BEHAVIOR
The dependent variable in my analysis of congressional responsiveness is the roll-call 
ideology of members of Congress. Typically, scholars rely on the voting scores assigned to 
legislators by various ideological groups, such as the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), a
liberal interest group, or the American Conservative Union (ACU), a conservative interest group.'7
However, the measurement of roll-call ideology using these interest group ratings has spawned a
considerable amount of controversy in recent years.
Brunell, et al. (1999) point out that interest groups generate ratings for a reason: to identify
their friends and expose their enemies. Moreover, they note that the rankings are based only on
18
key votes in each chamber of Congress selected by the groups themselves. Brunell et al. go on 
to argue that groups select different votes to rank members for the same reason they rank votes in 
the first place, to place likeminded members on one side of the scale and their ideological enemies 
on the other. Because the votes selected for measuring interest group voting scores are a biased 
sample of all roll calls, they argue that voting scores artificially create greater extremism in roll-call 
ideology than is actually the case. As Fowler states, ‘the net effect of the scores is to present a 
picture of Congress that is quite polarized." (1982, 406) That is, ratings by interest groups tend to 
assign extreme scores to a large fraction of members of Congress and moderate scores to 
relatively few members. Ultimately, Brunell et al. conclude, interest group measures are based on 
a biased subset of roll calls and therefore are biased measures of congressional voting behavior.
Support for this argument is provided in Figure 4.1, which displays the distribution of ADA 
scores for the 98m through the 104th Congresses. Examining this histogram makes clear the 
bimodality of ADA scores. It is as if someone stepped on the distribution of ADA scores.
17
Snyder (1992) points out that these ratings are used so extensively that virtually all
students of U.S. politics must be familiar with them.
18
Consequently, different groups will select different votes for consideration.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of ADA Scores
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depressing the middle and swelling the extremes. Snyder (1992) suggests that this artificial 
extremism in the distribution of interest group scores has serious consequences. Particularly, he 
notes, when the distribution of scores has artificially large tails, then the standard deviation of the 
distribution will be artificially large. Consequently, analyses that employ interest group scores will 
have t-statistics that are artificially small and therefore there will be a bias towards failing to reject 
the null hypothesis.
Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) suggest that an additional problem facing 
researchers who use interest group ratings is the inability to make intertemporal and interchamber 
comparisons. Because the set of votes used to construct the interest group ratings are different 
each year, the scales underlying interest group ratings are likely to shift and stretch across
19
chambers and time. Even more seriously, when ideological preferences in Congress change,
whether due to membership turnover or actual changes in members’ views, interest groups may
respond by changing the scales to keep the average score relatively constant As a result the
shifting and stretching of scales may seriously mask changes in congressional ideology or
preferences. The same principle also causes problems for interchamber comparisons. A Senator
and House member may have equivalent ideologies, but because most interest groups (ADA and
ACU particularly) employ different roll calls in constructing their ratings for the House and Senate
the two politicians may have very different scores from the interest groups. This difference is not
20
due to the member's roll-call behavior but rather the interest group’s selection process.
As an alternative to the standard interest group voting scores, I rely on more precise 
measures of roll call ideology that are based on Poole and Rosenthal’s (1991) spatial analysis of 
roll call voting from 1789 to 1985 (with the data updated through 1996). Poole and Rosenthal
They suggest the notion of shifting or stretching scales is best explained by an analogy 
to a thermometer. Suppose the tube of mercury is fixed, but one can change the marks on the 
side of the thermometer. If, say, all the marks and corresponding numbers are moved x units 
above the original marks, we say the scale has shifted. If one changes the marks so that the
difference between them increases, then we say the scale has stretched.
20
Groseclose et al. (1999) actually solve this problem by creating an index, much like an 
inflation index for consumer prices that allows one to make intertemporal and interchamber 
comparisons of interest groups. Unfortunately, their index does not solve the problems of bias 
found in interest group scores.
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utilize a dimensional scaling technique that yields a dominant single dimension applicable to all roll
call votes since 1789. Based on this analysis, each member of Congress from 1789 to the present
is assigned a score on this dimension. Because they are obtained using a technique that is
denoted the Dynamic Nominal Three-Step Estimation technique, these scores are commonly
21
referred to as D-NOMINATE, or NOMINATE scores. According to Poole and Rosenthal, this 
single dimension can be viewed as a party loyalty dimension, insofar as it separates Democrats 
and Republicans. However, because partisan cleavages that separate Democratic and 
Republican members of Congress are based largely on ideological differences, these scores are 
widely interpreted as a liberal-conservative dimension (Poole and Rosenthal, 1991). These scores 
range from -1.00 (pro-Democrat, liberal) to +1.00 (pro-Republican, conservative).
The primary advantage in employing Pool and Rosenthal’s measures of roll call ideology is that 
they utilize all roll call votes rather than a biased subset and therefore provide unbiased measures 
of roll call ideology. Moreover, the Poole and Rosenthal score’s distribution of which is exhibited in 
Figure 4.2 (98th -  104th Congresses) are somewhat more normally distributed than the interest 
group-based roll-call indices. This alleviates the problems of artificially large standard deviations 
found with interest group scores and therefore provides t-tests that are more reliable. Finally, 
because Poole and Rosenthal’s measures are not based on a Subset of votes from each congress 
but rather on all roll call votes they can be compared across congresses.
Of course, most scholars rely on the fore-mentioned roll-call indices created by interest 
groups such as ADA As an additional check, I have collected ADA scores for each member of 
Congress over the period of this study, and will duplicate my analyses with this measure of roll-call 
ideology as well. Similar results for the ADA analyses are expected, considering the strong 
correlation between ADA and D-NOMINATE scores. As reported in Table 4.1, the bivariate
This single dimension explains upwards of 80% of the variance in roll call voting over the 
period of their study. Poole and Rosenthal also uncover a second dimension, but this dimension 
accounts for a relatively minor proportion of the variance in roll call voting. This second dimension 
is interpreted as reflecting intra-party conflict, which is largely attributed to ideological differences 
within the parties. During periods of normal intraparty conflict, this dimension is very weak. 
However, realignment periods are often characterized by their intraparty conflict, and this 
dimension becomes stronger during realignment periods.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of D-Nominate Scores
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correlations between ADA scores and Poole and Rosenthal’s D-NOMINATE scores is highly 
significant and produces a Pearson’s r-square of 0.91.
Table 4.1: Bivariate Correlations Between D-NOMINATE and ADA Scores
NOMINATE
Scores ADA Score
NOMINATE Scores Pearson Correlation 1.000*** -.910***
N 3739 3693
ADA Score Pearson Correlation -.910*** 1.000***
N 3693 3695
*** prob < 0.01 level, one tail test
** prob < 0.5 level, one tail test
prob <0.10 level, one tail test
The scatter plot of ADA and D-NOMINATE scores displayed in Figure 4.3 also confirms 
the strength of this relationship. Considering this strong relationship between these two measures, 
similar results would be expected employing either ADA or D-Nominate scores. However, I argue 
that the D-Nominate scores provide the more accurate and useful measure.
CONSTITUENT IDEOLOGY
The measurement of constituency ideology has been a major concern and trouble of 
scholars interested in studying legislative representation and the democratic process. In previous 
research, legislative scholars have continually struggled to measure the ideological dispositions of 
congressional constituencies. Legislative scholars have utilized demographic variables (such as 
income, industry, education, urbanization, racial composition), small-sample estimates of public 
opinion (Miller and Stokes 1963), presidential and election results (LeoGrande and Jeydel 1997), 
simulated opinion based on the extension of estimates from individual-level models to the 
aggregate district level (Erikson 1978), and referenda voting (McCrone and Kuklinski 1979). 
Ultimately, these various measures of constituency opinion have all proven to be significantly less 
satisfying than what one would obtain if large-sample estimates of opinion were available across all 
districts.
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Figure 4.3: ADA Scores and D-Nominate Scores Scatter Plot
State Ideology
Fortunately, large sample estimates of opinion are available for the American states.
Utilizing data from the CBS News/New York Times surveys from 1976 to 1988 Erikson, Wright
and Mclver (1993) have created large-sample estimates of state political ideology. By aggregating
respondent’s ideological self-reports across surveys, Erikson et al., created samples for each state
22
that are sufficiently large enough to provide quite reliable estimates of state political ideology. 
Utilizing questions tapping into respondents’ ideological identity, they code respondents as liberal, 
moderate, or conservative, and measure the ideological orientation for each state as the mean 
ideology score for respondents residing in each state. Erikson et al. also report data on the mean 
ideology for party elites and partisan subgroups in each state — i.e., for Republicans, Independents, 
and Democrats. These additional measures provide researchers with indicators of the ideological 
orientation for partisan groups to which legislators of different partisan persuasions may be 
particularly responsive or unresponsive.
While Erikson et al.'s published measures of state and partisan ideology only contain data 
for the period 1976-1988, they have provided me with their updated data-base of CBS News/New 
York Times surveys through 1992. Utilizing this database and their methodology I have updated 
the measures of state and partisan ideology through 1992. (See Appendix A for Erikson et al. 
original and updated state ideology scores).
While the updated data do provide measures of state ideology that are more up-to-date 
and reliable, the updated measures of state ideology are highly correlated with the original 
measures of state ideology. This strength of this relationship is confirmed in Table 4.2, which 
displays the bivariate correlations between the original and updated measures of state ideology (r2 
= 0.901). Figure 4.4 also reinforces this strong relationship with a scatter plot of the original and 
updated state ideology measures.
The mean number of respondents for the updated measures of state ideology is 3,792. 
The minimum number of respondents is 337 in Wyoming and the maximum number of 
respondents is 17,100 in California.
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Updated State Ideology 
Figure 4.4: Original State Ideology and Updated State Ideology Scatter Plot
Table 4.2: Bivariate Correlations Between Original and Updated State Ideology




Original S t Ideology 
76-88 Pearson Correlation 1.00*** .901***
N 48 48
Updated St Ideology 
76-92 Pearson Correlation .901*** 1.00***
N 48 48
*** prob < 0.01 level, one tail test
** prob < 0.5 level, one tail test
prob < 0.10 level, one tail test
One key criticism of the Erikson et al. state ideology measures is that they fail to consider 
longitudinal variation in citizen ideology. While this criticism is valid, Erikson et al. contend that 
state ideologies are quite stable over time, and they maintain that their measures are a reasonable 
reflection of state ideologies throughout the post World War II era. While this is a highly debatable 
assertion, correlations of Erikson et al.’s state ideology with several alternative and dynamic 
measures of state ideology throughout the period of my analyses provides strong support for their 
argument (See Table 4.3).
Table 4.3: Bivariate Correlations for State Ideology, 1960-1996
Updated St Ideology 76- 
92
Original St Ideology 
76-88
Updated St Ideology 76-92 1.000*** 0.901***
Original S t Ideology 76-88 0.901*** 1.000***
Berry Citizen Ideology 1972 -0.673*** -0.517***
Berry Citizen Ideology 1974 -0.739*** -0.583***
Berry Citizen Ideology 1976 -0.768*** -0.651***
Berry Citizen Ideology 1978 -0.728*** -0.626***
Berry Citizen Ideology 1980 -0.742*** -0.635***
Berry Citizen Ideology 1982 -0.708*** -0.586***
Berry Citizen Ideology 1984 -0.741*** -0.601***
Berry Citizen Ideology 1988 -0.690*** -0.559***
Berry Citizen Ideology 1990 -0.697*** -0.559***
Berry Citizen Ideology 1992 -0.753*** -0.644***
Berry Citizen Ideology 1994 -0.696*** -0.561***
% 1976 Democratic Presidential Vote -0.104 -0.157
% 1980 Democratic Presidential Vote -0.146 -0.165
% 1984 Democratic Presidential Vote -0.615*** -0.535***
% 1988 Democratic Presidential Vote -0.621*** -0.498***
% 1992 Democratic Presidential Vote -0.521*** -0.501***
% 1996 Democratic Presidential Vote -0.639*** -0.584***
prob < 0.01 level, one tail test 
prob < 0.5 level, one tail test 
prob <0.10 level, one tail test
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In Table 4 .3 ,1 report correlation coefficients for the relationships between the Erikson et al. 
original and updated state ideology measures with the percentage of voters supporting the 
democratic candidates in the 1976 through 1996 presidential elections and a dynamic measure of 
state ideology reported by Berry et al. (1998). The results presented in this table suggest strong 
support for Erikson et al.’s claim. Their original and updated state ideology measures are strongly
and significantly correlated with the dynamic measures of state ideology provided by Berry et al.23 
Moreover, they are strongly and significantly correlated with the 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996 
Democratic Presidential elections. While there does appear to be a weak correlation with the 1976 
Democratic Presidential elections, this actually lends further support to Erikson et al.’s claim. The 
1976 presidential election is considered by many scholars as a classic example of a non- 
ideological election and primarily driven by the electorate’s attitudes toward Nixon and the 
Watergate scandal. Taken as a whole these results provide strong support for Erikson et al.’s 
contention that state ideology is quite stable overtime. Furthermore, they provide additional 
support for the strength and validity of Erikson et al.’s measures of state ideology.
Congressional District Ideology
While numerous scholars have examined legislative representation at the congressional 
district level, the lack of reliable measures of constituency ideology at the House district level has 
been a persistent and critical problem associated with these studies. As noted above, one would 
ideally want to have data drawn from large-scale samples in each of the 435 House districts, and 
then use these data to derive point estimates of constituency preferences, either for the geographic 
constituency as a whole or for subgroups within the constituency. Unfortunately, such an approach 
would strain the limited resources available for social-science research in the United States, and to 
date no such data collection effort has been made. Given this, scholars have had to rely on
23
Berry et al.'s dynamic measures of citizen state ideologies were created by using the 
outcomes of congressional elections, the partisan division of state legislatures, the party of the 
governor, and the roll call voting of state congressional delegations. These measures of state 
ideology are quite strong and reliable. However the use of congressional roll-call votes to create 
these measures of state ideology preclude their use in any analysis of representation.
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available data to provide rough estimates of House district ideology. Several alternative 
approaches for measuring constituency opinion have been suggested.
Small Sample Estimates of District Opinion
In lieu of large-sample estimates of district opinion, scholars have employed national 
samples with relatively small numbers of respondents from each of the sampled congressional 
districts. In their seminal work on legislative representation, Miller and Stokes (1963) utilized data 
from the 1958 American National Election Study (ANES) survey to estimate policy preferences at 
the district level and explore how those preferences were related to legislators' roll-call behavior. 
However, the mean sample size for House districts was regrettably only 11 respondents, which is 
well below the sample sizes used in conventional surveys to estimate public opinion. The problem 
with such small sample sizes is that they result in highly inefficient estimates of constituency 
opinion. Erikson (1978) notes that point estimates derived from such small random samples are 
unlikely to be biased — i.e., such small samples are equally likely to overestimate opinion as 
underestimate opinion — but the sampling error associated with measures based on such small 
samples is likely to be quite high. This means that the estimates of public opinion derived from 
small samples are likely to be relatively far removed from the actual (unobserved) value. 
Ultimately, parameter estimates from regression models based on small sample measures are 
also less efficient and are likely to be somewhat attenuated. Moreover, Erikson (1978) points out 
that the relationships between known district demographic characteristics and estimates derived 
from small samples are typically weak, which suggest that the small-sample estimates of 
constituency opinion are similarly inefficient All in ali, the use of small-sample estimates helped to 
establish the literature on legislative responsiveness to constituency preferences, but the significant 
limitations of this approach highlighted in the literature renders it less appropriate for studies of 
legislative policy responsiveness.
Demographic Variables
One of the most common approaches used in studies of policy responsiveness in the U.S. 
House is to measure constituency policy preferences using surrogate demographic variables. 
Usually, this involves estimating a model in which legislative roll-call behavior is depicted as a
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function of a wide range of district demographic characteristics obtained from the U.S. Census. 
The demographic variables employed in such studies typically include indicators of racial 
composition, education, income, age, social class, occupational distribution, urbanization, home 
ownership, and family composition. (Erikson 1978; Jackson and Kingdon 1992; Page, Shapiro, 
Gronke, and Rosenberg 1984; Wink, Livingston, and Garand 1996; Pool, Abelson, and Popkin 
1965; Weber and Shaffer 1972)
Scholars adopting such an approach make some important assumptions about the 
political meaning of demographic characteristics. In particular, one assumes that (1) individuals' 
demographic characteristics are related systematically to their policy preferences, (2) such a 
relationship holds when one moves across levels of analysis (i.e., from the individual level to the 
aggregate level), and (3) legislators are aware of the demographic composition of their districts and 
take those characteristics (or at least how they interpret those characteristics) into account when 
making roll-call decisions.
The first assumption is reasonable. Numerous studies have documented the 
demographic underpinnings of public opinion and political behavior; citizens’ general ideology and 
their views on public policy matters are often found to be related to their demographic 
characteristics. Such a relationship may be due to the degree to which self-interest is reflected in 
citizens' demographic characteristics, or else demographic characteristics might represent how 
different groups in society attain different sets of symbolic attitudes through the socialization 
process.
The second assumption — i.e. that the relationship between aggregate demographic 
characteristics and aggregate policy preferences is a reflection of the same relationships at the 
individual level — is less certain, since making such an assumption has the potential of violating the 
classic notions of the ecological fallacy. Simply, processes that operate at the individual level need 
not be in effect at the aggregate level. Although relationships found at the individual level often 
persist at the aggregate level, one must clearly take great care in making inferences about political 
processes across levels of analysis.
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Finally, are legislators aware of the demographic characteristics of the constituents that 
they represent, and do they interpret these characteristics in such a way as to permit the 
demographic flavor of a district to affect their roll-call decisions? Although there is little systematic 
evidence on this point, Fenno (1978) suggests that members of the U.S. House think about their 
geographic constituencies in terms of a number of attributes, including demographic 
characteristics. It is reasonable to think that legislators are aware of the demographic 
characteristics of their districts and consider those characteristics in characterizing their districts. 
And, it should be noted, it is entirely plausible for House members and other legislators to consider 
politically-relevant demographic characteristics as they cast roll-call votes.
Ultimately, studies that rely on demographic variables to represent constituency influences 
are quite limited. Demographic characteristics are only imperfectly related to policy preferences 
among individual citizens. Although demographic variables might have significant impacts on 
individuals' policy preferences, they typically explain only a small amount of the variance in such 
preferences, and this means that roll-call models that rely on demographic variables are missing 
quite a bit of the effect of constituency preferences. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding the 
policy implications of demographic variables means that the policy signals directed at legislators by 
their constituents' demographic characteristics are somewhat ambiguous. Knowing, for instance, 
that a district has a high proportion of its citizens with a college education does not necessarily give 
a legislator clear, unambiguous signals about the policy preferences of constituents, since this 
demographic characteristic, like others, is not perfectly related to policy preferences.
Presidential Election Results
Numerous scholars have also relied on presidential election results as a surrogate 
measure of district ideological orientation. (Nice and Cohen 1983; Johannes 1984; Glazer and 
Robbins 1985; Fleisher 1993; LeoGrande and Jeydel 1997). The logic underlying this is quite 
simple. Many citizens cast their votes in presidential elections by comparing their own ideological 
positions with those of the competing candidates. Insofar as aggregate presidential election results 
reflect ideological voting in the electorate, scholars should be able to utilize presidential election 
results at the district-level as a proxy measure of district ideology.
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One of the problems with this approach is that not all presidential elections are equally 
ideological in nature. Most observers agree that certain presidential elections are highly 
ideological, and that the presidential election results from those elections reflect the ideological 
characteristics of constituencies; the 1964,1972, and 1988 elections come immediately to mind as 
elections in which support for the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates was 
differentiated by ideological considerations. On the other hand, some elections are known for their 
detachment from ideology; the 1968 and 1976 elections are often characterized as being 
somewhat less ideological than other elections. Clearly, not all presidential elections are equally 
ideological, and this affects the degree to which scholars can use district-level presidential elections
24
results as a surrogate for distnct ideology.
Several scholars, however, have investigated the ideological nature of aggregate 
presidential election results. Rabinowitz, Gurian, and MacDonald (1984) and Rabinowitz and 
MacDonald (1986) have utilized factor-analytic techniques to determine the dimensionality of 
presidential election results at the state level. They uncover two dimensions, one of which is an 
ideological dimension, the other a partisan dimension. Given these results, it would appear that 
presidential election results in general are not exclusively ideological in nature, though some 
elections are more ideological than others.
More recently, LeoGrande and Jeydel’s (1997) exploration of the possibility of utilizing 
presidential election results as a surrogate for district ideology found only moderate correlations for 
presidential election results between adjacent elections, suggesting that the reliability of the 
aggregate presidential vote is not extremely high. Ultimately, this suggests that the presidential 
vote is not a consistent proxy for the long-term effects implied by constituency ideological 
orientations. Moreover, LeoGrande and Jeydel confirm the findings of Rabinowitz et al. (1984) and 
Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1986) that presidential election results can best be represented by two 
dimensions, one partisan and the other ideological. While the ideological dimension is the more
24
As evidence of the lack of an ideological orientation to the 1976 presidential election, 
one can consider the lack of a significant correlation between Erikson et al.'s measure of state 
ideology and the 1976 state presidential votes (r*= .15 and Alpha = .13)
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important of the two, LeoGrand and Jeydel contend that the consistently significant partisan 
dimension suggests that ideology is not the only long-term factor that affects presidential voting.
Unfortunately, one cannot readily utilize factor scores derived from a factor analysis of 
district-level presidential election results to measure ideology at the district level. For one thing. 
House districts change after every redistricting period, so it is impossible to utilize district-level 
presidential election data across decades in a factor analysis designed to create a general district 
ideology score. Even between census years and redistricting, it is difficult to utilize this approach in 
measuring district ideology. A factor analysis of presidential election results during, say, the 1970s 
would include one election (i.e., 1972) that is considered highly ideological, but would also include a 
nonideological election (i.e., 1976). Some presidential elections (i.e., 1964,1972,1988, and 1992) 
load more heavily on the ideological dimension, and LeoGrande and Jeydel suggest that scholars 
should only utilize data from these elections as a proxy measure of district ideology.
Referenda Results
One of the most innovative approaches to measuring district ideology involves the use of 
referenda data. In referenda elections, voters are confronted with one or more policy positions on 
which they can express their preferences. A number of states hold referenda elections on a 
regular basis, and scholars have found it possible to utilize district-level data on referenda election 
results to estimate the policy preferences and/or ideological orientation of a given constituency.
The use of referenda data as a surrogate measure of constituency policy preferences is 
best represented by the work of Kuklinski (1977) and McCrone and Kuklinski (1979). In both works 
the authors utilize data from California referenda to estimate the positions of district constituencies 
on three dimensions that emerge from a factor analysis of the referenda data. While these 
scholars find that referenda data can provide quite reliable measures of district ideology, 
unfortunately such data are available for only a limited number of states. Although referenda data 
measures can be used successfully in the limited number of states that utilize referenda elections, 
scholars must rely on other sources of data to measure constituent ideology for the majority of 
districts.
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“Bottom-Up” Simulations
Another innovation in the measurement of district opinion and constituency policy 
preferences is the use of simulated district opinion. This approach is designed to take advantage 
of demographic data that are available at the district level, as well as knowledge concerning the 
relationship between individuals’ demographic characteristics and their policy positions. In 
traditional simulations of constituency opinion, scholars utilize what we refer to as a "bottom-up" 
simulation—i.e., data from a tower level of aggregation (i.e., from individual-level surveys) are used 
to simulate opinion at a higher level of aggregation (i.e., the district level). This involves the 
following steps. First, survey data are used to estimate the relationship a t the micro-level between 
individuals' various demographic characteristics (e.g., race, income, etc.) and their opinions or 
attitudes (e.g., liberalism). The independent variables in these models must be selected with care 
to represent only those variables for which there are analogous aggregate data at the district-level. 
Second, once the individual-level regression estimates are obtained, the mean district 
characteristics on these independent variables are substituted into the regression model to yield 
predicted district-level opinion. The implication of this approach is that if individual-level variables 
are related to individual-level opinion, then aggregations of those individual-level variables should 
be related to aggregations of (district-level) opinion.
On the face of it this approach appears to be quite reasonable. The logic underlying the 
approach seems to be sensible, and simulated measures of opinion have been found to have a 
stronger association with roll-call behavior than measures based on small-sample estimates 
(Erikson 1978). Most importantly, the general availability of demographic and political variables 
with which to simulate public opinion means that this approach can be applied to estimating district 
opinion across a wide range of districts and across time.
Perhaps the most important concern that one might have with this approach is that the 
individual-level regressions upon which the simulations are based often exhibit relatively low levels 
of fit to the data. With adjusted R-square levels that often fell below 0.10, measures of simulated
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district-level opinion have a significantly large amount of random error associated with them. 
Ultimately, while such measures may be an improvement over those obtained from other analytical 
approaches, they remain somewhat imprecise indicators of constituency opinion.
“Top-Down” Simulation
Clearly, scholars have made an often-heroic effort to measure constituency opinion in 
legislative districts below the state level. Unfortunately, the various approaches found in the 
literature are unsatisfactory, either by their availability for a limited set of districts or years or by their 
high levels of measurement or sampling error. Because previous measures of district opinion have 
proven to be less than satisfactory, I have developed more reliable and useful measures of district 
opinion by employing an alternative approach to simulating constituency ideology. Specifically, I 
use a "top-down" simulation approach, which involves using data from a higher level of aggregation 
(i.e., the American states) to simulate opinion at a lower level of aggregation (i.e., congressional 
districts). Based on the updated state ideology measures provided by Erikson et al. (1993), I have 
estimated the relationship between state ideology, on one hand, and various demographic and 
political variables on the other. Once I estimate the parameters of the model of state ideology, I 
substitute analogous data from U.S. House Districts into the model to yield predicted levels of 
district opinion liberalism for House districts. The results provide an estimate of House district 
liberalism that reflect the observed relationships between opinion liberalism and various 
independent variables at the state level, as well as the values on these independent variables in 
U.S. House districts. I argue this measure is an improvement over measures based on bottom- 
down simulations, since the goodness-of-fit of the state-level simulation model is quite strong 
(Adjusted R-Square = 0.701).
Modeling State-Level Constituency Ideology
The first step in developing a “top-down" simulated measure of U.S. House district 
ideology is to establish a model of constituency ideology at the state level that can be used to
This is not necessarily a surprise. The level of measurement error in individual-level 
survey data is often much higher than that found in aggregate-level data.
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simulate House district constituency ideology. This model must include a range of independent 
variables measured at the state level that are analogous to variables available for congressional 
districts.
Separate models of state ideology were measured for the 1980s and 1990s. Individual 
models for each decade are necessary due to possible changes in the relationship between 
various independent variables and constituent ideology over time and the unavailability of 
presidential elections results across redistricting periods.
The dependent variable in my model is state ideology, as measured by Erikson et al. 
(1985) and updated through 1992. As noted above, these authors have utilized data from the CBS 
News/New York Times surveys to create large-sample estimates of state liberalism.
I include in my model several independent variables that one might expect to be related to 
state ideology and for which data are available for U.S. House districts. Following LeoGrande and 
Jeydel's (1997) argument that presidential election results from highly ideological elections can be 
used as surrogates for district ideology, I include in my model a variable to represent the effects of 
state-level presidential election results. For the 1980s model of state ideology this variable is 
measured as the average percentage of the vote for Democratic candidates in the 1984 and 1988 
presidential elections. For the 1990s model of state ideology this variable is measured as the 
average percentage of the vote for Democratic candidates in the 1992 and 1996 presidential 
elections. The factor analysis results provided in Table 4.4 confirm the ideological nature of each 
of these presidential elections. Each of these elections loads heavily on the single ideological 
dimension, confirming their strong ideological nature. I hypothesize that the coefficient for this 
variable, b,, will be negative, indicating that states in which the democratic presidential candidate 
made a strong showing will be less conservative than those states in which the democratic 
candidate ran poorly.
I also include a series of demographic variables found in previous research to be related to 
mass state ideology. These include the proportion of blue-collar workers in the state workforce, the 
proportion of the population living in an urban area, the proportion of homeowners among all 
households, and a dichotomous variable representing the Deep South region.
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Table 4.4: Factor Analyses for Presidential Elections
Variable Component
1
St Ideology 76-92 -.776
1984 Democratic Presidential Vote .934
1988 Democratic Presidential Vote .871
1992 Democratic Presidential Vote .869
1996 Democratic Presidential Vote .863
Initial Eigenvalues






Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
I hypothesize that the size of the blue-collar work force and the number of urban residents
will be negatively related to state conservatism, while home ownership and the deep south region 
will be positively related to state conservatism.
State Ideology = a + b, (Average Democratic Presidential Vote) + b2 (%Blue 
Collars Workers) + (%Urban Population) + b4 (%Home ownership)
+ b5 (Deep South)
A brief definition of the variables included in this model can be found in Appendix B.
Although I have collected data on a wide range of state and district-level characteristics 
that could conceivably serve as theoretically-plausible independent variables in a model of state or 
district ideology, only demographic variables whose relationship at the state level was shown to be 
similar at the House district level are used. The similar relationship between the demographic 
variables used in my model and state and district ideology is displayed in Table 4.5.
able 4.5: Correlations Between Independent Variables and Democratic Presidential Vote
Democratic Presidential Vote in 
Congressional Districts
Democratic Presidential Vote 
in State
% Who Own Home -0.616*** -0.264***
% Blue Collar Workers -0.073** -0.162**
% Urban Population 0.348*** 0.140
Deep South -0.202*** -0.345***
N 770 100
prob < 0.01 level, one tail test 
prob < 0.5 level, one tail test 
prob <0.10 level, one tail test
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Table 4.5 displays the Pearson correlations between the demographic variables used in 
the model of state ideology and the proportion of constituents who voted for the Democratic 
presidential candidates at the state and House district levels. These bivariate correlations confirm 
the similar relationship between the demographic variables employed in my model and the 
proportion of constituents who voted for the democratic presidential candidate, a relatively reliable 
measure of constituent ideology that is available at the state and House district level.
Estimating Ideology in U.S. House Districts
It is important to note that the major reason for estimating a model of state-level ideology is 
to permit me to estimate the ideological orientations of House district constituencies. Once I have 
estimated my model of state ideology, I can substitute House district-level values on each of the 
independent variables in the model and multiply each value by its associated unstandardized 
regression coefficient The resulting predicted values represent the estimated ideological 
orientation of each House district based on (1) the observed relationship between these variables 
and state ideology, and (2) the values of these variables for each House district 
A Caveat: The Race Problem
Any casual observer of American politics is aware of the relationship between race and 
ideology. Black and many other minority citizens are, on average, more liberal than non-minority 
citizens. (Tate 1993) In the aggregate, it is reasonable to expect that districts or states with large 
black or minority populations will be significantly more liberal than districts or states without large 
black or minority populations.
Given this, one could argue that any model of mass state ideology-or, for that matter, 
district ideology—would need to include as an independent variable a measure of the proportion of 
black or minority citizens in the population. It is not implausible to think that higher proportions of 
black and other minorities in state electorates would be related to higher levels of roll-call liberalism 
among U.S. senators and that, knowing this, the same relationship would be observed in the U.S. 
House.
Unfortunately for my purposes, the American states are much more homogeneous in 
terms of racial composition than are U.S. House districts. The variation in black population
61
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
proportions among the states is quite truncated; the states range from a low of .22% (Montana) to 
a high of 36% (Mississippi), and the standard deviation in black population proportion across states 
is 9.2. This compares to a range of black population proportions in House districts of .07% to 
92.07% and a standard deviation of 15.5. Most importantly, in no state do the minority and/or black 
proportion exceed 50% (See Table 4.6). This is a crucial issue, for it appears that the relationship 
between minority population and district ideology is nonlinear. For those districts or states with 
racial minority population proportions below 50%, increases in the minority population are 
associated with greater ideological conservatism. For those districts or states with racial minority 
population proportions above 50%, the opposite is true; increases in minority population 
proportions are associated with lower levels of ideological conservatism. Consequently, the 
direction of the relationship between racial composition and constituent ideology is different for 
states and congressional districts. These different relationships are vividly displayed in Figure 4.5.
It should be noted that in a preliminary analysis I estimated the state ideology model to 
include the black and/or minority populations in each state as one of the independent variables. 
Surprisingly, the coefficients for black or minority population proportions were all positive, 
suggesting that increases in black or minority populations are associated with higher levels of 
ideological conservatism. One possible explanation for this is the hostility, or threat, hypothesis. 
(Lublin and Cameron 1986) The central idea underlying this hypothesis is simple. When blacks or 
other ethnic groups are in a minority, white citizens begin to perceive an increased threat as the 
proportion of minority group members begins to approach 50% of the overall population. At 
relatively high black or minority population proportions, white citizens perceive the greatest threat 
and respond with increased levels of ideological conservatism. Ultimately, this means that the 
most conservative states are those with the highest proportion of blacks and other minorities in 
their populations. On the other hand, a number of House districts have black and/or minority 
population proportions in excess of 50%. These districts pass the threshold levels implied by the 
hostility hypothesis. Where the black or minority population proportion exceeds 50%, the 
ideological liberalism of the constituency increases as that proportion increases. Hence, the 
positive relationship between bfack or minority population and constituency conservatism observed
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Descriptive Statistics for Black Populations Proportions
Decade Congressional District or State Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
1980
States .22 35.19 9.06 9.27
Congressional Districts .07 92.07 11.42 14.87
1990
States .26 35.59 9.50 9.24
Congressional Districts .13 73.95 11.86 16.12
Total
States .22 35.59 9.28 9.21
Congressional Districts .07 92.07 11.64 15.50
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Figure 4.5: State/District 1988 Democratic Presidential Vote and Percent Black 
Population
below the 50% mark becomes a negative relationship above that mark. What this means is that in 
the population of states (where the black and/or minority populations are always below 50%). a 
negative relationship between racial composition and ideological conservatism is found. In the 
population of House districts, the opposite relationship is expected (see figure 4.5).
Finally, since I am using relationships observed in the states to estimate House district 
ideology, I assume that the relationships observed in the states are similar to those found for 
House districts. With regard to race, this is clearly not the case. To utilize the relationship between 
racial composition and constituency ideology at the state level to estimate House district ideology 
would lead one to expect the House districts with 90%+ black population to be the most 
conservative! Clearly, there are nonlinearities in the relationship between racial composition and 
district ideology, and the truncated variance on the racial composition variable among the states 
prevents a precise estimation of the nonlinear relationship. Ultimately, I am left with no other 
alternative than to discard the race variable from my models. Fortunately, some of the effects of 
race are likely to be captured in other variables such as the Democratic presidential vote, urban 
population, and home ownership.
State-Level Estimates
The OLS regression estimates for my model of state-level mass ideology are presented in
Table 4.7. For the most part, the model fits the data quite well. The adjusted R2 for my model is
above 0.70 for both the 1980s and 1990s analyses, suggesting that nearly three-fourths of the
26
variance in mass state ideology is explained by the independent variables included in my model. 
The strong fit of the model is graphically displayed in Figure 4.6, in which I provide scatter plots of 
state ideology and the predicted measures of state ideology. Clearly, my model does a reasonably 
good job in explaining state ideology. Based on this, I would expect my model to do a reasonably 
good job at simulating constituency opinion in U.S. House districts.
26
It should be noted that the R-square for models employing aggregate data will naturally 
be higher than those which employ individual level data. Consequently, direct comparisons 
between standard bottom-up models of state ideology, which typically report R-squares of less than 
.15, cannot be directly compared to R-square (>.70) of the top-down model reported in this 
research.
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Variables B T-Score B T-Score
(Constant)
1980s Democratic Pres Vote 
% Who Own Home 
% Blue Collar Workers 


























Adjusted R-Square .701 .704
Number of Cases 48 48
*** prob < 0.01 level, one tail test 
** prob <0.5 level, one tail test 
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The coefficients for the model are, with a few exceptions, consistent with expectations. As 
has been suggested in recent research (e.g., LeoGrande and-Jeydel, 1997), the Democratic 
presidential vote is negatively and significantly related to mass state ideology; states that provided 
Michael Dukakis, Walter Mondale, and Bill Clinton with a relatively high vote proportion exhibit the 
lowest level of mass ideological conservatism. As expected, the proportion of residents living in 
urban areas is also significantly and inversely related to mass conservative ideology. Conversely, 
the coefficient for the states of the Deep South and the proportion of homeowners are both 
significant and positively related to mass conservative ideology. Clearly, states from the Deep 
South and states with a large proportion of homeowners have significantly higher levels of mass 
ideological conservatism. Finally, although the proportion of blue-collar workers appears to be 
inversely associated with mass ideological conservatism, the results for this variable are not 
statistically significant in either decade.
Simulating House District Opinion
Having developed and tested my model of state mass ideology, I utilize the coefficients 
from the model to generate predictions as to the level of ideological conservatism in each House 
district for the 1980s and 1990s. This is done by substituting values from each House district and 
for each variable in the model into the prediction equation and solving the equation to generate a 
predicted value for each House district The values for my measure of district ideology for each 
House district during the 1980s and 1990s are presented in Appendix C. In Table 4 .8 ,1 report the 
descriptive statistics for the simulated measure of House district ideology and include the 
descriptive statistics for the Erikson et al. measure of state ideology as a point of comparison.
Table 4.8: Descriptive Statistics of Predicted State and District Ideology
i Minimum ! Maximum Mean I Std. Deviation
St Ideology 76-92 j -1.42 27.32 13.79 | 7.68
1980s State Predicted | 
Ideologies I -2.52 24.65 13.53 | 6.73
1980s District Predicted j 
Ideologies I -46.71 32.44 10.61 ! 13.67
1990s State Predicted j 
Ideologies I -1.78 25.56 13.61 1 6.73
1990s District Predicted j 
Ideologies i
-42.50 | 35.47 10.78 | 13.71
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First the mean ideology measure for the state data is 13.79, as compared to the mean 
House district ideology of 10.61 for the 1980s and 10.78 for the 1990s. This is not a large 
difference, but it does suggest that constituents from House districts are, on average, marginally 
less conservative than state constituencies. This may be due in part to the fact that more populous 
states are, on average, somewhat more liberal than smaller states; the larger number of House 
districts from these more populous (and more liberal) states results in an average House district 
ideology that is more conservative than the average state.
Second, as can be seen in Table 4.8 and Figure 4.7, the dispersion of the House district 
ideology measure is much greater than for the Erikson et al. state ideology measures. The range 
of the state ideology variable is from -1.42 (for Rhode Island) to 27.32 (for Idaho), and the standard 
deviation is 7.68. For the estimates of House district ideology, the ranges are from -46.71 (16m 
District in New York) to 32.44 (9m District in Georgia) for the 1980s and -42.50 (16^ District in New 
York) to 35.47 (10th District in North Carolina) for the 1990s, and the standard deviations are 13.67
for the 1980s and 13.71 for the 1990s model.27 In one real sense, this is not surprising. While 
state boundaries are fixed, and while the populations of states change relatively slowly. House 
districts are often drawn to represent common interests that are somewhat narrow in nature. 
Furthermore states are large enough to avoid relatively extreme ideological orientations. House 
districts are small enough that some will be on the extreme ends of the ideological distribution. For 
instance, while no state has a black population that is in the majority, there are numerous House 
districts that have very large black populations, and these districts are likely to have populations 
that are more liberal than the most liberal state. Moreover, the enhanced variance in the mass 
ideological orientations of House districts represents not only between-state differences, but also 
differences that exist within states. For instance, even the most conservative (liberal) state will
2 7  ^
The liberal 16 District of New York is located in the South Bronx. It is described in 
Congressional Quarterly’s Politics in America as a solidly democratic district and as "one of the 
most economically devastated areas in the United States.” The conservative 10th District of North 
Carolina is described in Politics in America as “the most rock-ribbed Republican district in North 
Carolina. In 1990 GOP Senator Jesse Helms posted his best showing in the 10th Congressional 
District.
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have House districts that are more conservative (liberal) than the state mean; this means that the 
range for constituency ideology will be greater than that for the states.
One way of testing the validity of my measure of simulated House district ideology is to 
explore the degree to which the measure is correlated with congressional roll call behavior. If the 
bivariate correlation between the simulated measures of district ideology and House members roll- 
call behavior is similar in magnitude to the bivariate correlation between established measures of 
state ideology and Senate roll-call behavior, this would suggest the reliability and validity of my 
measures.
Table 4.9 provides the bivariate correlations for Senate and House D-Nominate scores 
and state and simulated district ideology. First, for U.S. senators the relationship between state 
ideology and roll call ideology is strong and significant, though the magnitudes of the correlation 
coefficients are not quite as high as one might expect Erikson et al.'s measures of state ideology 
are correlated with D-Nominate scores (r = 0.421), indicating that senators representing more 
conservative (liberal) states exhibit conservative (liberal) roll-call behavior. For the House, the 
simulated measure of district opinion performs as expected; the simulated measure is strongly and 
significantly related to House members' roll-call behavior for D-Nominate scores (r = 0.582). In 
fact, the relationship between D-Nominate scores and simulated House district ideology is actually 
stronger than the relationship between D-Nominate scores and state ideology.
Table 4.9: Correlations Between D-Nominate Scores and Constituent Ideology






P&R Nominate Scores 1.000 .421*** .582***
State Ideology .421” * 1.000
Simulated House District 
Ideology .582 1.000
prob < 0.01 level, one tail test 
prob <0.5 level, one tail test 
prob <0.10 level, one tail test
I argue that these similar results provide support for the validity and reliability of my 
simulated measure of House district ideology. Ultimately, considering the significant weaknesses
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of available measures of district constituent ideology, the top down simulated measure appears to 
provide a significantly improved measure of district ideology.
ELECTORAL THREAT
As noted, scholars have long suspected that legislative policy responsiveness is enhanced 
by electoral threat Following this lead, I hypothesize that the relationship between constituent 
preferences and congressional voting behavior will increase as the level of district electoral 
competitiveness increases. Electoral competitiveness is typically measured as the simple 
difference between the incumbent and challenger's vote margin. For my primary model of 
congressional responsiveness, I will employ this standard measure. I suggest that the relationship 
between roll-call conservatism and constituency preferences will decrease as members’ margins of 
victory increase, but the relationship will be strengthened for incumbents winning by close electoral 
margins. Given this, the coefficient for the interaction between election margin and constituency 
preferences is expected to be negative.
Erikson (1971) makes the argument that congressional responsiveness and electoral
threat is a two-way causal process and, therefore, that congressional election results are
inadequate measures of electoral threat Following Erikson’s lead, I also employ as an alternative
measure of electoral threat the difference in the proportion of voters who supported the Republican
28
and Democratic presidential candidates. I hypothesize that the coefficient for the interaction of 
congressional and presidential electoral margins with constituent ideology will be negative, 
indicating that members with larger congressional or presidential electoral margins will be less 
responsive to constituency preferences than those with smaller electoral margins.
CONGRESSIONAL RETIREMENT
In order to capture the effects of congressional retirement I code all congressmen who do 
not run for reelection in the next election as one, while congressmen who do run for reelection in 
the next election are coded as zero. In line with previous research, members of Congress running
Erikson argues that the presidential vote, since it is unaffected by previous levels of 
congressional responsiveness, provides a more accurate measure district partisanship or 
competitiveness.
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for a higher office or a state office are also coded as retiring. While these members are not 
necessarily retiring from public office, they no longer have the same incentive as members running 
for reelection to be responsive to their constituents. In feet there is an incentive for these 
members of Congress to move in the ideological direction of their potentially new city, state, or 
national constituency.
ELECTORAL PROXIMITY
For my models of senate roil-call behavior, I also estimate the intervening effects of 
electoral proximity. I suggest that responsiveness will be greater for senators facing reelection 
than those who are not up for reelection. While a limited amount of research on this topic has 
measured electoral proximity as the actual number of years until the Senator's next election, I 
employ the standard measure of electoral proximity. I measure electoral proximity as a 
dichotomous variable which is simply coded zero for senators serving in the first two congresses of 
their term and one for senators serving in the congress immediately preceding their bid for 
reelection. I hypothesize that the coefficient for the interaction of this variable with constituency 
policy preferences will be positive, indicating that senators facing reelection will be more responsive 
to constituency preferences than those who are in the first two or four years of their six year terms 
in office.
CONGRESSIONAL SENIORITY
Congressional seniority is simply measured as the numbers of year’s a member has 
continuously served in his or her present chamber of congress. As the reader may recall. I 
propose two separate and contradictory hypotheses regarding the relationship between a 
member's congressional seniority and their level of congressional responsiveness: (1) the 
relationship between constituent preferences and congressional voting behavior will decline as 
congressional seniority increases and (2) the relationship between constituent preferences and 
congressional voting behavior will increase as congressional seniority increases. A negative and 
significant coefficient for interaction of this variable and constituent ideology will provide support for 
my first hypothesis that congressional responsiveness decreases as member seniority increases. 
On the other hand, a positive and significant coefficient for the interaction of this variable and
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responsiveness decreases as member seniority increases. On the other hand, a positive and 
significant coefficient for the interaction of this variable and constituent ideology will indicate support 
for my second hypothesis that congressional responsiveness increases as member seniority 
increases.
CONSTITUENT POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT
Constituent political engagement is hypothesized to increase the level of congressional 
responsiveness in a district This hypothesis is based on the idea that politically engaged voters 
are more likely to make their preferences known and to then hold members accountable if they 
ignore their preferences. Following the previous but limited research on constituency political 
engagement, I measure constituent political engagement as the proportion of the population in 
each district with a college education.
As an alternative measure of constituent political engagement a limited number of scholars 
have also suggested the use of voter turnout. The critical problem with this measures is that voter 
turnout is strongly influenced by numerous factors other than the level of political engagement in a 
district or state. For instance, voter turnout is strongly influenced by the competitiveness of state 
and local elections and the extent of campaign media coverage of these various elections.
While the proportion of the population in each district with a college education obviously 
does not provide a direct measure of constituent political engagement, Zaller (1986; 1992) has 
demonstrated that education performs as a reliable and valid measure of political engagement. 
Moreover, Zaller concludes that education performs very well as a measure of political 
engagement, and while it is highly correlated with constituent political knowledge, it contains far 
less measurement error. Research by Delii Carpini and Keeter (1996) also finds that citizen’s 
knowledge and understanding of politics is highly correlated with their educational levels. 
Particularly, they find that college graduates are significantly more informed about politics than 
citizens who have less than a college education.
29
It should be noted that less than 2% of the members of congress in the study retired 
from their congressional seat to run for an alternative office.
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i hypothesize that the coefficient for the interaction of the proportion of college graduates 
and constituent heterogeneity will be positive and significant, indicating that congressional 
responsiveness increases as the proportion of college graduates in a district increases.
MEASURES OF CONSTITUENT HETEROGENEITY
Because direct measures of constituent political heterogeneity are not available, scholars 
have employed numerous surrogate measures of this concept. These surrogate measures include 
(1) the standard deviation of house members’ ideological voting scores (Goff and Grier 1993), (2) 
electoral margins (Fiorina 1973; Fiorina 1975), (3) the level of district split ticket voting (Anderson 
and Roscoe 1998), and, most commonly, (4) the Sullivan index of demographic diversity. (Ardoin 
and Garand 1996; Bullock III 1983; Herrick and Thomas 1993; Morgan and Wilson 1990; Bailey 
and Brady 1998; Bond 1983; Fiorina 1974; Sullivan 1973; Wright 1978)
Each of these measures of constituent diversity has significant problems. First the 
standard deviations of House members’ ideological voting scores are impractical for analyses of 
House members for obvious reasons. For one thing, each district is represented at any given time 
by only one member, hence rendering the measure of variation in House members’ voting scores 
impossible. Moreover, this measure assumes that House members accurately represent the 
ideology of their constituents. Obviously, this is a questionable assumption for analysis of the 
influence of constituent diversity on representation. Electoral margins are also inappropriate, since 
even the most heterogeneous districts may produce large electoral margins if an incumbent 
congressman faces a weak challenger or uses the advantages of incumbency to significantly 
improve his electoral safety. Likewise, the level split ticket voting in a district is also highly subject 
to the qualify of congressional and presidential candidates. In addition, direct measures of split 
ticket voting are actually not available and can only be derived through complex estimating 
procedures.
The Sullivan index is by far the most common and accepted measure of constituent 
heterogeneity found in congressional research (Ardoin and Garand 1996; Bullock III 1983; Herrick 
and Thomas 1993; Morgan and Wilson 1990; Bailey and Brady 1998; Bond 1983; Fiorina 1974; 
Sullivan 1973; Wright 1978). Utilizing a range of social, ethnic, and economic data, Sullivan
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constructed an easily interpretable index of demographic diversity for political scientists. The 
measure is an index constructed from the following formula first developed by Stanley Lieberson 
(1969) (See Appendix D for Example of Sullivan Index Computation):
A«, = 1 - ( I c P2/V)
Aw is the index of diversity within a population.
P is the proportion of the population within a given category of each
variable used in the index.
C is the total number of categories within all variables.
V  is the number of variables.
One reason for the popularity of the Sullivan index is its simplicity and flexibility. Sullivan's 
index scores are simply interpreted as probability terms that represent the proportion of 
characteristics upon which a randomly selected pair of individuals will differ (assuming sampling 
with random replacement), thus the higher the index, the greater the diversity. In addition to being 
straight forward, Sullivan’s index is also quite flexible. It can be constructed for any population 
using any number of population variables, with each variable divided into any number of categories. 
Consequently, this allows the researcher to select any number of variables and categories in order 
to properly fit their theory.
Unfortunately, as noted by Koetzle (1998), the Sullivan index is only a measure of the 
absolute diversity and not the political diversity of a constituency. More specifically, the Sullivan 
Index is a unidirectional measure of diversity that fails to consider the relationship between 
numerous demographic variables and politics. As a vivid example of this shortcoming, consider 
the three hypothetical districts in Table 4.10.
Using the Sullivan Index all three of these districts would have a diversity score of .42 and, 
therefore, would be classified as very diverse districts. However, should we consider all of these 
districts to be equally politically diverse? Clearly, a review of the data in Table 4.10 suggests that 
we should not The demographic characteristics of District C unmistakably suggest a politically 
diverse district with education and labor demographics typical of a liberal district (70% less than 12 
Years education and 70% blue collar) and racial and geographical demographics typical of a
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conservative district (70% white and 70% rural). On the other hand, the demographics of District A 
and District B characterize relatively homogeneous liberal and conservative districts respectively. 
The identical Sullivan Index scores for each of these three very different districts clearly illustrate 













Blue Collar 70% 30% 70%
White Collar 30% 70% 30%
Education <12 years 70% 30% 70%
Education >12 years 30% 70% 30%
Black 70% 30% 30%
White 30% 70% 70%
Urban 70% 30% 30%
Rural 30% 70% 70%
Sullivan Index .42 .42 .42
Koetzle (1997) correctly argues that a measure of political diversity should be guided or 
influenced by the' relationship between various demographic variables and political preferences. 
Understanding that liberal preferences are more common in urban and minority constituencies and 
that conservative preferences are more common in well educated and wealthy constituencies 
suggests that the greater the number of common political factors in a district that point in the liberal 
or conservative direction, the less politically diverse a constituency. For instance, if a set of 
constituency characteristics is examined and they all tended to favor Democrats (e.g. there was a 
high proportion of blue collar workers, urban residents, minorities, and relatively low levels of 
education) then this district would be accurately described as politically homogeneous. In contrast, 
to the degree these same characteristics tend to cancel one another out (e.g. a high proportion of 
blue collar workers and urban residents but also a high proportion of whites and college graduates) 
then we would describe this district as politically heterogeneous.
77
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Following this logic, Koetzle (1997) has constructed an improved measure of political 
diversity. Using demographic data gathered for each House district Koetzle’s measure is 
constructed by taking deviations from the mean values of four demographic variables (black 
percent, urban percent percent of high school graduates, and median family income) for each 
apportionment period. Thus, homogeneous liberal districts are those with a higher proportion of 
minority and urban voters and relatively lower levels of income, education, and whites; while 
homogeneous conservative districts are the reverse. Koetzle defines those districts with a mix of 
these characteristics as politically diverse.
This method of calculating the demographic diversity of districts allows Koetzle to construct 
a continuous measure of political diversity that recognizes the differential ideological impact of 
various demographic variables. Taking the signed average deviation from the median values 
creates a continuous measure of political diversity. Large negative values represent districts that 
are conservative or pro-Republican in demographic composition; large positive values represent 
districts that are libera! or pro-Democratic in demographic composition; and values near zero 
represent politically diverse districts. These values are then transformed such that the greater the 
value, the greater the diversity of the district
In Table 4.11, I provide examples of Koetzle’s political diversity measure for the three 
hypothetical constituencies originally examined with regard to the Sullivan Index above. The 
results of this table vividly display the validity of Koetzle’s measure of political diversity. District A 
and District B, the two politically homogeneous districts, each score a -.899 on the Koetzle 
measure of political diversity, which correctly suggests that they are relatively homogeneous. 
Moreover, their average deviation measure correctly categorizes District A as a liberal or 
Democratic leaning district and District B as a conservative or Republican leaning district District 
C, the politically diverse district scores a zero on the Koetzle measure of political diversity which 
correctly indicates it is a politically heterogeneous district
Koetzle does not create measures of state political diversity. However, measures of state 
diversity can be easily produced by simply replicating Koetzle's method of constructing measures 
of House district political diversity with state demographics.
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Blue Collar 70% 30% 70%




Urban 70% 30% 30%
Political Diversity -.866 -.866 0.00
Considering my hypothesis that the relationship between constituent preferences and 
congressional voting behavior will decrease as the level of constituent political heterogeneity 
increases, I expect the coefficient for the interaction between my diversity measure and constituent 
ideology to be negative.
PARTY IDENTIFICATION
Considering the significant ideological differences between the Democratic and 
Republican parties in Congress, I also include in my model of congressional responsiveness a 
measure of member partisan identification. The partisan identification of members is simply coded 
as a dichotomous variable with Democrats coded as zero and Republicans coded as one. The 
reason for including party identification in my model is to control for the ideological patterns of 
member roll call behavior independent of the influence of constituent preferences. The coefficient 
for party identification is expected to be positive, indicating that Republican members of congress 
are more conservative than Democratic members in their roll-call behavior — independent of the 
influence of constituent preferences.
DATA
In order to explore the relationships depicted in my model of congressional representation,
I utilize data from the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives for the years 1982 to 1996 
(98,n to 104th Congresses). Measures of congressional roll call behavior were provided by Keith
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Poole. (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) Updated measures of state constituent ideology are derived 
from the CBS News/New York Times opinion surveys provided by Gerald Wright Simulated 
measures of House district Ideology are derived from demographic data provided by the Bureau of 
the Census (1980 and 1990 Summary Tape File 3D, Congressional Districts of the United States). 
Presidential and congressional electoral data are gathered from the 1982 through 1998 Editions of 
the Almanac of American Politics (1982-1996). Seniority and retirement data are derived from 
ICPSR study 7803, “Roster of U.S. Congressional Officeholders and Biographical Characteristics 
of Members of the United States Congress, 1789-1996." (McKibbin 1996) (See Appendix E for 
detailed description of all variables.)
MODELING VARIATION IN CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIVENESS
As noted, the data used in this dissertation are collected for each House member and 
Senator serving in Congress from 1982 to 1996. Given this, I have panel data, also known as 
pooled cross-sectional time-series data. My unit of analysis is the member-Congress, with data 
collected for each rth member in each fth Congress over the course of the time period under study.
Panel data present some interesting problems for model estimation. Although ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression is typically used in analyses of legislative representation, the
31
pooling of data for several congresses necessitates the use of alternative estimation procedures. 
First, because member cases are not independent over time, one might expect serial dependence 
in the data, also referred to as the problem of autocorrelated errors or autocorrelation. This means 
that the error terms for individual senators at time t are likely to be correlated with the error terms 
for subsequent time periods. For instance, a senator whose level of policy conservatism at time t is 
above the mean is likely to exhibit a level of policy conservatism at time t+1 that is also above the 
mean level of conservatism for all members; in both cases the error term is positive, and 
collectively the result is a positive correlation between error terms at times t and t+1. Second,
30
Voting scores are downloaded from Keith Poole's World Wide Web page: 
http://k7moa.gsia.cmu.edu/dwnl.htm.
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unequal variance across cross-sections or time, also known as heteroskedasticity, is inherent in 
pooled data. For a variety of reasons, some of which are substantively important and some of 
which are not, some cross-sections (House members or senators) are naturally more variable over 
time than others. Such differential variability is usually of little concern in unpooled data, given that 
it influences only a single case at a time. Unfortunately, in pooled data the differential variance 
problem is likely to affect whole sets of data (e.g., all House members or senators for one region) 
and have considerably greater potential to do harm. While autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
do not necessarily bias OLS estimates, they do seriously influence the efficiency of OLS estimates. 
Consequently, when autocorrelation and/or heteroskedasticity are present, the usual t and F tests 
of significance are no longer valid and are likely to yield seriously misleading conclusions about the 
statistical significance of estimated regression coefficients.
In order to correct this problem, I utilize the generalized estimating' equation (GEE) 
approach described by Zeger and Liang (1986). The GEE approach is an extension of the 
generalized least squares (GLS) random-effects estimator, and is appropriate when the number of 
cross-sections (i.e.. House members and senators) is larger than the number of time points. This 
model can also be used with unbalanced data-that is, data in which the number of data points for 
each cross-section are unequal. Most importantly, this procedure yields parameter estimates that 
are uncontaminated by the effects of autocorrelated and heteroskedastic errors.
Finally, due to the significant differences in the Senate and House of Representatives 
(such as constituency size, chamber size, and term duration), separate models of congressional 
representation will be tested for each chamber.
MODELS OF CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIVENESS
In simplest terms. I suggest that the ideological nature of roll call voting by members of 
Congress will vary systematically as a function of the ideological preferences of their 
constituencies. In simple terms:
31
Although the pooling of the data does cause special challenges to the analysis of this 
model, the more robust and reliable estimates of a pooled analysis unquestionably outweigh the 
disadvantages.
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Model 1: Base Constituent Ideology Model
Roll-Call Conservatism = a + b, (State Ideology)
If members are responsive to the ideological views of their constituents, bi should be 
positive, indicating that members representing constituents with relatively conservative populations 
exhibit relatively conservative roll-cal! behavior.
Considering the importance of partisan identification on congressional roll call behavior, I 
also test a simple model of congressional responsiveness that includes constituent ideology and 
member’s party identification:
Modef 2 :Base Constituent Ideology and Party identification Model
Roil-Call Conservatism = a + b, (Constituent Ideology) + b2  (Member Party)
Once again, the coefficient for constituent ideology is expected to be positive. However, a 
positive and significant coefficient for constituent ideology in Model 2 will confirm the influence of 
constituent preferences independent of member’s party identification. The coefficient for party 
identification, b2. is also expected to be positive, simply indicating that the roll-call behavior of 
Republican party members is more conservative than Democratic party members. Of course, I 
hypothesize that the linkage between constituency preferences and member's roll-call behavior is a 
function of several mediating member and constituent conditions or variables. These mediating
32
affects are modeled through the use of a series of interaction variables:
Model 3: Comprehensive Senate Model
Roll-Call Conservatism = a + b, (Constituent Ideology) + b2 (Member Party) + 
b3 (Electoral Marginality* Constituent Ideology) + b4 (Retirement- 
Constituent Ideology) + bs (Electoral Proximity-' Constituent Ideology) + 
bs (Member Seniority' Constituent Ideology) +■ b7 (College Graduates' 
Constituent Ideology) + b8 (Constituent Diversity' Constituent 
Ideology) + b9 (Electoral Marginality) + b10 (Retirement) + bn (Electoral 
Proximity) + b12 (Member Seniority) bi3 (College Graduates)+ b14 
(Constituent Diversity)
Interaction variables allow for the examination of changes in the influence of ideology on 
voting behavior associated with changes in the variables hypothesized to mediate this relationship.
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Model 4: Comprehensive House Model
Roll-Call Conservatism = a + b, (Constituent Ideology) + b2  (Member Party) + 
b3 (Electoral Marginality* Constituent Ideology) + b* (Retirement* 
Constituent Ideology) + b5 (Member Seniority* Constituent Ideology) + 
b6 (College Graduates* Constituent Ideology) + b7 (Constituent 
Diversity* Constituent Ideology) + ba (Electoral Marginality) + b9 
(Retirement) + b,0 (Member Seniority) b,t (College Graduates)* b,2 
(Constituent Diversity)
As noted above, I hypothesize, constituent heterogeneity, lack of electoral competition, and 
the decision to retire will diminish the relationship between constituent ideology and congressional 
roll call ideology. Consequently, 1 expect the coefficients for the interaction of constituent 
heterogeneity, electoral margins, and retirement with constituent ideology will be negative, 
indicating that these constituent and member conditions decrease congressional responsiveness. 
Conversely. I hypothesize, proximity to the next election and high levels of political engagement will 
enhance the relationship between constituent ideology and congressional roll call ideology. Hence, 
I expect the coefficients for the interaction of electoral proximity and political engagement with 
constituent ideology will be positive, indicating the constituent and member characteristics enhance 
congressional responsiveness. Finally, considering the two conflicting yet equally valid arguments 
regarding the influence of member seniority on congressional responsiveness, I propose two 
alternative and conflicting hypotheses. Accordingly, I employ a two-tailed test of significance to 
examine the controversial influence of member seniority on congressional responsiveness.
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSES OF CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIVENESS
Now that I have developed a comprehensive model of congressional responsiveness, I am 
now prepared to examine properly the influence of the various member and constituent conditions 
hypothesized to explain variation in the responsiveness of members of congress to the preferences 
of their constituents.
In order to first establish a base line of the independent influence of constituent ideology on 
congressional roll call behavior I begin this chapter with a brief discussion of two simple models of 
congressional roll call behavior that include constituent ideology (Model 1) and constituent ideology 
and member party identification (Model 2). The results of these models are expected to indicate 
the relative influence of constituent preferences and member’s party identification on congressional 
roll-call behavior. After establishing the baseline levels of congressional responsiveness. I move 
on to the comprehensive models of congressional responsiveness developed in Chapter 4. These 
models are expected to permit one to test the independent influence of the member and 
constituent conditions hypothesized to explain variation in congressional responsiveness.
BASE MODELS OF CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIVNESS
As a starting point, in Table 5.1 I report the individual regression results for the base 
models of Senate and House roll call behavior. As expected, the coefficient for constituent 
ideology is positive and statistically significant for both the Senate and House analyses. The 
results of these analyses confirm that constituent ideology does explain a modest amount of the 
variation found in congressional voting behavior.
While constituent ideology only explains about 21% percent of the variation in Senate roll 
call behavior, constituent ideology explains on average 34% of the variation in House roll call 
behavior. This significantly greater amount of variation in House roll call behavior explained by 
constituent ideology is not necessarily surprising, considering the much larger and more diverse 
constituencies Senators must represent as compared to House members. As suggested in 
chapter 3. the complexity of signals sent from heterogeneous state constituencies is much more 
difficult to interpret and most likely leaves Senators with few tangible signals with which to make roll 
call decisions. While several House districts can be described as solidly liberal or conservative
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Table 5.1: Base Models for Congressional Responsiveness
Model 1 Model 2
Senate House Senate House
Coefficients Z Score Coefficients Z Score Coefficients Z Score Coefficients Z Score
Constant -.422 .6.26“ * -.189 -13.58*“ - -.701 23,09*** -.405 48.21“ *
Constituent Ideology .029 6.65*** .016 24.733“ * .017 9.025*** .008 19.31***
Member Party . . . . . . . . . — .819 28.93*** ,669 55.16“ *
N 700 3039 70 3 3039
Pseudo R2 .21 .34 .78 .77
Dependent Variable: D-Nominate Score 
*** prob < 0.01 level, one tail test 
** prob <0.5 level, one tail test 
* prob < 0.10 level, one tail test
districts, few if any states can be describes so easily. Moreover, the results of this analysis 
perhaps indicate that like our Founding Fathers hoped, the six-year terms and diverse populations 
of the U.S. Senate allows members of the Senate to be more independent of the desires and 
demands of their constituents.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 graphically display the simple relationship between constituent 
ideology and roll call ideology for the Senate and House. Members who are very responsive to 
their constituent’s ideological preferences are located on or close to the fit line while the less 
responsive members are located far below or above the fit line.
While a substantial proportion of congress members fall on or near the fit line, many rail 
significantly above or below. These scatter plots highlight the significant variation in levels of 
responsiveness found within Congress.
Model 2 in Table 5.1 provides the results for the more complete base line model of 
congressional roll call behavior. Not surprisingly, this model explains a significantly higher amount 
of the variation in House and Senate roll-call behavior.
As expected, the coefficients for constituent ideology and party identification are significant 
and positively related to constituent ideology. The significant and positive coefficient for constituent 
ideology simply reinforces the results of the original baseline model. As the ideological preferences 
of a constituency become more conservative, the roll call behavior of their representative becomes 
more conservative, controlling for the effects of party. The positive and significant coefficient for 
party identification confirms the ideological differences between partisans in congress. Moreover, it 
suggests that constituents can utilize member's party identification as a simple means of 
understanding their ideological leanings.
Although these simple figures and models clearly confirm the relatively moderate levels of 
congressional responsiveness found in both houses of Congress, they cannot explain or account 
for the substantial variation in levels of responsiveness that we observe. The comprehensive 
models of congressional responsiveness developed in Chapter 4, however, do allow us to examine 
this issue.
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Figure 5.2: District Ideology and House D-Nominate Scores Scatter Plot
COMPREHENSIVE MODELS OF CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIVENESS
What explains variation across members and districts in legislative policy responsiveness? 
Table 5.2 provides the results of the full Senate and House models of congressional 
responsiveness depicted in Models 3 and 4 of Chapter 4. For the most part the results confirm my 
hypotheses. While these models do not explain all of the variation in congressional 
responsiveness, they do provide an improved understanding of why some members of Congress 
are extremely responsive to the preferences of their constituencies while other members 
apparently deviate significantly from their constituent's preferences. When asked why some 
members of Congress are extremely responsive to the preferences of their constituents and others 
seemingly ignore their constituents, we can now begin to offer some insights.
Influence of Electoral Margins
I begin my analysis of variation in levels of congressional responsiveness with an 
examination of the influence of electoral margins on levels of congressional responsiveness. As 
noted earlier, the influence of electoral margins on responsiveness has been the focus of a 
substantial amount of research on congressional responsiveness. In line with the majority of 
previous research, I hypothesize that the relationship between constituent preferences and 
congressional voting behavior will decrease as a member’s electoral margins increase.
The coefficient for the interaction of ideology and electoral margins for the Senate model 
support this hypothesis. Senate responsiveness does decline as the electoral victory margins of 
senators increase. This indicates that the tough competition found in U.S. senate elections 
enhances senators responsiveness to the preferences of their state constituents. A siim electoral 
victory apparently keeps senators on their toes and prompts them to be particularly responsive to 
their constituents.
While the coefficient for the interaction of ideology and electoral margins in the House 
model is also significant, the relationship is unexpectedly positive. This indicates that for the U.S. 
House of Representatives responsiveness increases as House member’s electoral victory margins 
increase. These findings directly contradict my hypothesis.
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Comprehensive Interaction Models for Congressional Responsiveness
Model 3 Model 4
U.S. Senate U.S. House U.S. Senate U.S. House
Coefficients Z Score Coefficients Z Score Coefficients Z Score Coefficients Z Score
Constant -.5010403 -4.971“ * -.3599112 -15.091*** -.465017 -4.505*** -.3544336 -15.350*“
Constituent Ideology .0085413 1.305* .0043253 3.203*“ .0028728 0.351 .0088745 6.459***
Member Party .8089961 26.811*“ .6451413 51.263*** .8077929 26.861*** .6512927 51.355***
Ideology * Heterogeneity -.0064775 -1.362* -.0016048 -1.849“ -.0092597 -1.867** -.0036952 -3.353***
Ideology ‘ College Grads .0005385 1.490* .0002715 6,167*** .0008674 1.971“ ,0001296 2.762***
Ideology ‘ Electoral 
Margins -.0001453 -2.146“ .0000231 1.978“
. . . . . . — —
Ideology * Pres. Margins — — — — -.0000876 -0'655 " .000011 67513
Ideology * Retiring .0068943 1.220 .0015653 1.080 .0064023 1.141 .0018877 1.337*
Ideology * Seniority .0006496 3.364“ * .0000196 0.452 .0005601 3.022“ * .0000152 0.354
Ideology * Election Year -.0002098 -0.103 — .0001007 0.050 — -----
Heterogeneity .0282297 0.395 -.0183019 -1.029 .0747715 0.987 .0583085 2.924***
College Graduates -.0082257 -1.632* -.0001705 -0.212 -.0120673 -2.244** .0009385 1.103
Electoral Margins .0021238 1 660“ .0002214 1.051 — — ---- . . .
Presidential Margins — — — — .0032756 1.546* -.0033061 -8.209“ *
Retiring -.0786777 -0.872 -.0525961 -2.154“ -.0755221 -0.841 -.0539243 -2.268***
Seniority -.0131605 -4.178“ * -.0050965 -6.941*“ -.011931 -3,922*** -.005114 -7.032***












Dependent Variable: D-Nominate Score
*** prob < 0.01 level, one tail test 
** prob < 0.5 level, one tail test 
* prob < 0.10 level, one tail test
Considering these surprising results. I turn to the arguments of Erikson (1971) and 
Kingdon (1981) who argue that congressional responsiveness and electoral threat is a two-way 
causal process. In other words, they argue that these results are perhaps due to very responsive 
House members being rewarded for their behavior.
In addition, I argue that these findings may also stem from highly responsive and popular 
House members being able to intimidate quality challengers. For instance, if a House incumbent is 
extremely responsive to the preferences of his constituents, his/her popularity and high approval 
ratings will most likely discourage any quality candidates from mounting a challenge in their next 
bid for reelection. Unlike in the U.S. Senate, there are a very limited number of quality candidates 
ready to challenge incumbent House members. Consequently, if an exceptionally responsive 
incumbent House member is able to scare away one or two quality candidates, the opposing party 
will be left without a credible candidate to challenge the incumbent
In conclusion, I argue that the unexpected results of the House model do not necessarily 
suggest that electoral competition does not influence the level of congressional responsiveness in 
the House. Rather, I suggest that these results provide support for Erikson (1971) and Kingdon’s 
(1981) hypothesis that large electoral threat is a two-way process and electoral margins are 
partially the result of previous levels of legislative responsive members.
Considering these results, I conduct an alternative analysis that examines Erikson (1971) 
and Kingdon’s (1981) arguments. The results of this analysis are reported under Model 4 in Table 
5.2. As Erikson (1971) proposes. Model 4 employs presidential margins as an alternative measure 
of district electoral threat According to Erikson, presidential margins provide a valid and alternative 
measure of electoral threat that is not biased or rather influenced by the behavior of highly 
responsive members.
The statistically non-significant results for the presidential margins coefficient for both the 
Senate and House models indicate that the level of presidential election competition in a district is 
not related to variation in levels of congressional responsiveness. These results suggest that either 
the presidential margins in a district are poor measures of electoral threat or Erikson and Kingdon’s 
alternative hypothesis is incorrect
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In summary, my analyses of electoral threat provide very different results for the Senate 
and House models of congressional responsiveness. Evidently, due to significant differences in 
the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives, electoral threat plays a very different and 
distinctive role in each. While the results of Model 3 clearly suggest that electoral threat has a 
significant and positive influence on the level of constituent responsiveness observed in the 
Senate, they surprisingly indicate that electoral threat has a significant and negative influence on 
the level of constituent responsiveness in the House. Finally, the additional analyses presented in 
Model 3 that examines the alternative hypotheses of Erikson (1971) and Kingdon (1981) provide 
results that are statistically non-significant and inconclusive.
Influence of Retirement
Considering the notion that retiring members of Congress are no longer constrained by the 
desire to be reelected and hence may vote their own preferences rather than the preferences of 
their constituents, I hypothesize that the decision to retire from congress will weaken the 
relationship between constituent preferences and congressional voting behavior. Surprisingly, the 
results for both the Senate and House models fail to support this hypothesis. The coefficients for 
the interaction of constituent ideology and retirement in the Senate and House models are not 
statistically significant These results suggest that the decision to retire does not have a significant 
impact on the level of congressional responsiveness.
Apparently, members of congress do not begin to ignore the preferences of their 
constituents after deciding to retire. This is conceivably because members of Congress who 
remain in office long enough to retire have personal ideological preferences that are very similar to 
the preferences of their constituents. Moreover, responsiveness may simply become habitual for 
members of Congress. After being responsive to the preferences of their constituents year after 
year, the idea of simply ignoring constituent preferences is perhaps implausible.
These results seem to confirm the recent findings of Lott and Reed (1989) and Pool and 
Rosenthal (1997). The voting behavior of members of congress is quite stable over time. 
Moreover, the eventual decision to retire has no significant impact on the level of constituent 
responsiveness members of Congress display in their roll call voting behavior. Ultimately, these
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results confirm that members of Congress who have decided to retire from office (and are 
therefore freed from the restraints of reelection) do not suddenly turn their backs on their 
constituents.
Electoral Proximity
Considering the long six-year election cycle of senators and the short-term memory of 
constituents, many scholars speculate that senators are relatively less responsive to constituency 
preferences during the early part of their term, but that they shift their behavior in a more 
responsive direction with proximity to the next election. The non-significant coefficient for the 
interaction of ideology and reelection year reported in Table 5.2 for the Senate model means that 
there is little support for this hypothesis. Senators do not significantly increase their level of 
constituent responsiveness prior to their bid for reelection. U.S. Senators are. apparently, as 
responsive during the first four years of their six-year terms as they are in the last two years. 
Apparently, the insulation of long terms, which the founders believed U.S. Senators would enjoy, is 
no longer effective. Senators, like member of the House, spend their entire term in office worrying 
and preparing to run for reelection.
While these results directly challenge the recent findings of Ahuja (1994), they do lend 
support to the earlier findings of Bernstein (1991), Hurley (1992) and, more recently, Poole and 
Rosenthal (1997). As Poofe and Rosenthal (1997) argue. Senators apparently maintain a relatively 
constant level of responsiveness throughout their six-year terms. More generally, Poole and 
Rosenthal (1997) argue that the ideology of members of Congress, measured through their roll-call 
behavior, is tremendously consistent throughout their congressional careers. Rarely do members 
significantly alter the general ideological position of their roll-call behavior.
Seniority
In chapter 4 I put forward two hypotheses regarding the influence of Congressional 
seniority on responsiveness. The first suggested that the relationship between constituent 
preferences and congressional behavior would decline as seniority increased. This hypothesis was 
based on the idea that members might become non-responsive to the ideological changes in their
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district, as the advantages of incumbency would insulate them from defeat The second 
hypothesis suggested that the relationship between constituent preferences and congressional 
voting behavior would increase as congressional seniority increases. This hypothesis was based 
on the idea that seniority was actually the result of members of congress being responsive to their 
constituents. Also, senior members know their districts better, know what their constituents want 
and hence are better able to behave, in a responsive manner.
The results reported in Table 5.2 for the Senate model suggest support for my second 
hypothesis that the relationship between constituent preferences and congressional voting 
behavior increases as seniority increases. These results indicate that the Senate electoral process 
successfully filters out unresponsive incumbents. More specifically, U.S. senators who are not 
responsive to the preferences of their constituents often face defeat and are then replaced by 
candidates who promise to be more responsive. Responsive senators survive to become senior 
senators.
Alternatively, these results may also suggest that the experience senior senators acquire 
in interpreting the ideological signals coming from their constituents assist them significantly in 
discerning the often-confusing signals sent from their constituents. Consequently, senior Senators 
are more responsive to the preferences of their constituents than their junior counterparts.
While the results reported in the Senate model indicate that seniority is positive and 
significantly related to constituent responsiveness, the coefficient for the interaction of House 
seniority and constituent ideology is positive but not statistically significant I argue that the results 
of the House model are perhaps the product of limited electoral competition in many house 
districts. While the electoral process does filter out many of the unresponsive members of the 
House, the advantages of House incumbency coupled with the lack of quality challengers and 
electoral competition in many House districts may occasionally allows unresponsive members to 
be reelected and remain in office.
Political Engagement
Considering the idea that politically engaged citizens are more likely to hold and indicate 
their preferences and also more likely to punish/reward their legislators for
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unresponsive/responsive behavior, I hypothesize that the relationship between constituent 
preferences and congressional voting behavior will increase as the level of constituent political 
engagement increases. This hypothesis is based on the idea that signaling and accountability 
mechanisms are more likely to occur in districts comprised of highly educated and politically active 
citizens than in districts comprised of citizens with low levels of education and political activity.
The results for both the Senate and House models provide strong support for this
hypothesis. Specifically, the coefficients for the interaction of constituent ideology and the
proportion of college graduates are positive and significant, indicating that responsiveness to 
constituent preferences Increases significantly as constituents become more politically engaged.
This apparent relationship, I argue, is a result of the propensity of more politically engaged 
constituencies to indicate policy preferences to their members of congress and to then hold them 
accountable for their voting behavior. Moreover, it may suggest that the lack of responsiveness 
that many members display is partially due to the low level of political engagement and attention 
characterizing their constituents. If constituents make their policy preferences known and hold their 
members of congress accountable for their voting behavior, the level of congressional
responsiveness they receive will increase significantly. Likewise, if constituents fail to make their 
policy preferences known and to hold their members accountable, they cannot expect high levels 
of congressional responsiveness.
Political Heterogeneity
Finally, I hypothesize that the relationship between constituent preferences and
congressional voting behavior will decrease as the level of constituent political heterogeneity 
increases. This hypothesis is built on the idea that heterogeneous constituencies are more likely to 
convey to their representatives conflicting and ambiguous signals regarding their preferences, 
while homogeneous constituencies are more likely to convey relatively clear signals regarding their 
preference. Confronted with relatively clear signals from their constituents, members of congress 
from homogeneous districts are hard pressed to deviate from the policy preferences of their 
constituents, lest they subject themselves to an enhanced threat of electoral defeat in subsequent 
elections.
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Once again, the results of the Senate and House models both provide strong support for 
my hypothesis. Specifically, the interaction of constituent ideology and constituent heterogeneity 
for the Senate and House models are both negative and significant, indicating that the influence of 
general constituent ideology systematically decreases as constituent heterogeneity increases. 
Presumably, in homogeneous districts constituents send relatively clear signals about their policy 
preferences to their senators, and senators react by aligning their roll-call behavior to those 
constituency preferences. In diverse constituencies, however, the signals emanating from 
constituents are much more muddled, meaning the members of congress have a more difficult 
time in discerning the policy preferences of their general constituency and acting on them when it is 
time to cast roll-call votes. In essence, this means that House and Senate members who 
represent homogeneous districts are more responsive to general constituency preferences than 
those representing diverse, heterogeneous districts. Moreover, it may be argued that members 
from diverse districts turn to their partisan or reelection constituency for signals regarding their
33
voting behavior.
As suggested, homogeneous districts apparently send relatively clear signals about their 
policy preferences and their legislators evidently react by aligning their roll-call behavior to those 
constituency preferences. In diverse districts, however, the signals emanating from the general 
constituency are much more muddled, meaning their representatives have a more difficult time in 
discerning their policy preferences and acting on them when it is time to cast roll-call votes.
In conclusion, the effects of constituent diversity on legislative responsiveness seem to be 
quite strong. These findings clearly suggest that the ability of homogeneous districts to provide 
unambiguous and consistent signals to their members of Congress significantly influences the level 
of responsiveness they receive.
SUMMARY
Based on the analyses presented in this chapter we now have an enhanced understanding 
of the impact of various constituent and member characteristics on congressional responsiveness.
33
Preliminary analyses conducted for the Senate support this argument
96
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
First, we know that constituent conditions play a significant role in understanding variation in levels 
of congressional responsiveness. Particularly, we recognize that as the level of constituent political 
engagement increases congressional responsiveness systematically increases. Members of well- 
educated and political engaged districts enjoy significantly higher levels of congressional 
responsiveness as compared to less educated and politically apathetic districts. Moreover, 
responsiveness is significantly greater in homogeneous districts, given that their members of 
congress are more likely to receive relatively clear and consistent signal regarding constituent 
policy preferences.
While the models of congressional responsiveness suggest the influence of constituent 
conditions on Senate and House responsiveness is both significant and similar, the influence of 
member characteristics on responsiveness is anything but consistent and often not significant For 
the Senate analysis, electoral margins are inversely related to responsiveness, indicating that 
electoral competition increases Senate responsiveness. Surprisingly the results of the House 
analysis indicate that electoral competition decreases responsiveness. However, I contend that 
these results are primarily due to a lack of electoral competition in House districts. With regard to 
the influence of congressional retirement, the analyses indicate that the decision to retire does not 
have a significant effect on responsiveness. Moreover, the results for the electoral proximity 
hypothesis indicate that Senators do not significantly increase their level of constituent 
responsiveness prior to their bid for reelection. Finally, Senate seniority is found to be significantly 
and positively associated with responsiveness while the effect of House seniority is positive but not 
significant
In summary, the results of these analyses suggest that member characteristics have a 
quite limited affect on levels of congressional responsiveness. On the other hand, they indicate 
that constituent conditions explain a considerable amount of the observed variation in 
congressional responsiveness. Ultimately, I conclude that future research on congressional 
responsiveness must continue to consider the influence of both member and constituent conditions 
on congressional responsiveness while focusing more closely on the significant and sizable 
influence of constituent conditions.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
This dissertation is based on the simple notion that not all members of congress are 
equally responsive to the policy preferences of their constituents. Accordingly, it asks the simple 
question: why are some members of Congress more responsive to their constituents than other 
members of Congress? While some of the variation in congressional responsiveness is seemingly 
random, it is also likely that there is a systematic component to that variation. Some members of 
congress are more or less responsive to their constituents’ preferences because of their own 
characteristics or the relevant characteristics of their constituencies.
In this dissertation, I have developed and tested several comprehensive models of 
congressional responsiveness that attempt to explain variation in the levels of responsiveness 
found within congress. My models depict variation in responsiveness to constituency preferences 
as a function of member and constituent characteristics. Specifically, I suggest that variation in 
congressional responsiveness is a product of electoral threat, congressional seniority, constituent 
engagement, and political heterogeneity.
First, the results of my core analyses confirm that constituent ideology does play a limited 
but significant part in the roll call decisions of members of congress. Furthermore, the analyses 
confirm that there is significant variation in the level of congressional responsiveness to constituent 
preferences. More importantly, the results of my comprehensive analyses provide reasonably 
strong evidence that member and constituent conditions explain much of the variation in levels of 
congressional responsiveness. Interestingly, my analyses indicate that constituent conditions have 
a more consistent and perhaps more significant impact on levels of congressional responsiveness 
than member characteristics. This is particularly interesting and perhaps troublesome, considering 
the fact that previous studies of congressional responsiveness have virtually ignored the impact of 
constituent conditions.
Both of the constituent conditions hypothesized to influence the level of congressional 
responsiveness received by constituents were found to have a significant and consistent impact 
First, district political engagement, as measured by the proportion of the district population with a 
college degree, is found to increase systematically congressional responsiveness. Members from
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politically engaged districts are significantly more responsive than members from districts 
characterized by less engaged constituencies. Evidently, signaling and accountability mechanisms 
are more likely to occur in politically engaged districts than in politically apathetic districts. Second, 
congressional responsiveness is found to systematically decrease as the level constituent 
heterogeneity increases. Apparently, the inconsistent and perhaps conflicting signals sent from 
heterogeneous constituencies makes responsiveness more difficult if not impossible for legislators.
The influence of member characteristics on congressional responsiveness is surprisingly 
inconsistent and often at odds when comparing the Senate and House models. For instance, the 
electoral margins coefficient provides contradictory results for the House and Senate models. 
While results indicate that electoral margins are inversely related to responsiveness in the Senate, 
they indicate a positive relationship with responsiveness in the House. While these conflicting 
results are definitely unexpected, I attribute them to the different levels of electoral competition 
found in House and Senate elections. The results for the impact of seniority are also inconsistent 
for the House and Senate models. While seniority is not found to have any significant impact on 
responsiveness in the U.S. House, it is found to have a significant and positive impact on the level 
of responsiveness in the Senate. Apparently, high levels of competition found in Senate elections 
successfully filters out those incumbent Senators who are not responsive to the preferences of 
their constituents. Finally, the decision to retire and proximity to the next election is not found to 
significantly influence legislative policy responsiveness.
IMPLICATIONS OF ANALYSES
The findings of my analyses have strong implications for debates surrounding the electoral 
process and the creation of legislative districts through the redistricting process. First, if increasing 
levels of legislative responsiveness is a goal of state legislatures, then constituent heterogeneity 
should receive serious consideration when redrawing legislative district lines. If district 
heterogeneity makes policy responsiveness more difficult, how state legislators draw congressional 
and state-legislative district lines may seriously affect the representative nature of legislative 
districts. Since diverse constituencies decrease legislative responsiveness, one might argue that 
district lines should be drawn to maximize the homogeneity of legislative districts.
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Moreover, the results of my analyses indicate that political engagement is strongly related 
to legislative policy responsiveness. Clearly, House and Senate members who represent well- 
educated, politically engaged constituencies are more responsive to those constituencies than 
those members who represent less engaged districts or states. These results certainly suggest the 
importance of citizens' responsibility for their own self-governance. Arguably, citizens have a 
responsibility to become political engaged as a means of fostering enhanced policy 
responsiveness. Moreover, the recent trend toward higher levels of political apathy and declining 
political engagement suggests the possibility that legislative responsiveness will be on the decline 
in years to come. This is speculation, of course, but such a speculation is consistent with the 
evidence presented here.
Moreover, the suggestion that seniority increases legislative responsiveness has 
significant implications for how voters cast votes in legislative elections. While there are obviously 
some senior legislators who have become detached from their districts and are no longer 
responsive to constituency preferences, for the most part the results suggest that legislative 
responsiveness is higher among legislators who are more senior. This has serious implications on 
the potential impact of term limits. If seniority increases member’s levels of responsiveness, then 
congressional term limits may actually decrease the level of congressional responsiveness. What 
is necessary at this point is further research on the question of why seniority is related to legislative 
responsiveness. Is it that more senior members become more knowledgeable about their districts 
and become more responsive as a result? Or is it that constituents both filter out those members 
who are not responsive and reward those members who are with reelection and increased 
seniority.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Where does research go from here? Clearly, this study leaves many unresolved issues 
that should be explored in future research. First, future research on congressional responsiveness 
must continue to consider the importance of both member and constituent conditions on 
congressional representation. As noted in this work, congressional scholars have consistently and 
erroneously ignored the influence of significant constituent conditions on congressional
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responsiveness. This has been a serious fault in the field of congressional representation and 
future research cannot prolong this oversight
For instance, with regard to the influence of constituent heterogeneity, we must consider 
whether members from heterogeneous constituencies are responsive in other ways to the 
preferences of their constituents? Specifically, as constituents become more heterogeneous, do 
members of congress target the policy views of their own partisans when the policy signals coming 
from their constituencies are more ambiguous? Measures of the ideological preferences of 
partisans provided by Erikson. Wright, and Mclver allow for tests of these possibilities.
In addition, the analysis presented in this work focuses solely on the influence of various 
member and constituent characteristics on general ideological responsiveness, but future research 
should consider the impact of these characteristics on variation in responsiveness across a range 
of distinct issues. For instance, do electoral margins or constituent heterogeneity have different 
affects on economic issues and social issues? Are House members and senators more or less 
responsive to their constituents on salient issues, particularly as their constituency characteristics 
vary across districts?
Finally, I recognize the largely indirect nature of the evidence presented in this work. 
Particularly. I do not directly observe constituent ideology or constituent political heterogeneity and 
political engagement Rather, I use surrogate measures of these concepts, and this leaves me far 
from providing a definitive test of the true affect of these factors on congressional responsiveness. 
Yet, I suggest that my evidence is perhaps the best available, and further, that my interpretation of 
the evidence is quite plausible.
Obviously, a more definitive examination of the factors that influence congressional 
responsiveness awaits the completion of additional research. Clearly one important step is to 
continue to refine our measures of key concepts. I believe that better data, while not necessarily a 
guarantee of better results (in the sense that the coefficients fit hypotheses), can go a long way 
toward a better understanding of why some members of Congress are quite responsive to the 
preferences of their constituents v/hile others apparently ignore them. In sum, better data can
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provide a better understanding of the process of congressional representation. However, I believe 
that I have taken some steps, tentative as they may be, on that journey.
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APPENDIX A: STATE IDEOLOGY MEASURES
State State Ideology Updated Number of Respondents(1976-1988) State Ideology (1976-1992) (1976-1992)
Alabama 23.10 24.07 2.946
Arizona 18.20 16.64 2.151
Arkansas 18.30 20.04 1.966
California 6.20 5.96 171.00
Colorado 8.60 8.64 2.245
Connecticut 4.40 4.43 2.618
Delaware 12.20 9.80 510
Florida 17.10 15.98 8,599
(Georgia 17.70 17.55 4,318
Idaho 27.90 27.32 765
Illinois 10.10 9.50 7.844
Indiana 16.70 15.95 4,275
jlowa 13.50 12.39 2,3721
iKansas 15.90 15.50 2.193
Kentucky 13.20 13.28 2,681
Louisiana 23.00 22.85 2.805
Maine 14.70 9.99 911
Maryland 5.70 5.35 3.418
Massachusetts .80 -.21 4,730
Michigan 8.80 8.94 7,550
Minnesota 12.80 12.34 3,557
1
•Mississippi 25.40 26.95 1,555
Missouri 15.50 15.13 3,912
Montana 11.10 11.30 637
Nebraska 18.70 17.06 1,442
Nevada .20 -.16 627
New Hampshire 12.80 13.19 864
New Jersey 3.40 3.15 6,054
.........
New Mexico 16.00 13.95 975
New York 3.10 2.82 1.3067
North Carolina 20.70 20.31 4,490
North Dakota 26.60 22.24 580
Ohio 10.10 9.65 8.798
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State State Ideology (1976-1988)
Updated 
State Ideology (1976-1992)
Number of Respondents 
(1976-1992)
Oklahoma 27.30 27.04 2,500
Oregon 7.90 8.52 2,382
Pennsylvania 10.60 9.92 9,897
Rhode Island 2.10 -1.42 703
South Carolina 21.40 22.15 2,691
South Dakota 24.10 24.14 700
Tennessee 16.60 17.28 3,629
Texas 23.20 22.61 10,978
Utah 28.00 26.91 1,074
Vermont 11.40 10.79 519
Virginia 17.90 17.63 5,038
Washington 5.90 4.65 3,918
West Virginia 9.20 9.16 1,724
Wisconsin 10.50 10.81 4,007
Wyoming 17.80 19.58 337
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APPENDIX B: VARIA BLES FOR STATE IDEOLOGY MODEL
Variable Description
State Ideology Mass State Ideology as measured by Erikson, Wright, 
and Mclver and updated through 1992.
1980s Democratic Presidential 
Vote
The Average percentage of the population over 18 years 
old which voted for Walter Mondale and Michael 
Dukakis in the 1984 and 1988 Presidential Elections.
1990s Democratic Presidential 
Vote
The Average percentage of the population over 18 years 
old which voted for Bill Clinton in the 1992 and 1996 
Presidential Elections.
% Blue Collar Workers The percentage of the population employed in Blue 
Collar occupations as reported by Congressional 
Quarterly (Blue Collar occupations include: Precision 
production, craft, and repair occupations; and operators, 
fabricators, and laborers including machine operators, 
assemblers, and inspectors; transportation and material- 
moving occupations; and handlers, equipment cleaners, 
helpers and laborers).
% Urban Population The percentage of the population living in urbanized 
areas and in places of 2,500 or more outside urbanized 
areas.
% Who Own Home The percentage of the population living in owner- 
occupied housing.
Deep South Coded 0 for all non-deep south states and House 
districts and coded 1 for states and House districts in the 
deep south (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida. Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina. South Carolina, 
Texas, and Virginia).
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Predicted Ideology 80s Predicted Ideology 90s
Alabama 1 23.51 26.96
Alabama 2 22.40 28.79
Alabama 3 22.51 24.49
Alabama 4 24.93 27.43
Alabama 5 22.73 24.19
Alabama 6 14.84 33.44
Alabama 7 22.44 -0.20
Alaska 1 13.58 17.35
Arizona 1 15.49 8.92
Arizona 2 -0.51 -2.18
Arizona 3 22.75 20.42
Arizona 4 21.85 13.84
Arizona 5 14.20 9.82
Arizona 6 — 16.20
Arkansas 1 17.83 12.15
Arkansas 2 19.35 12.29
Arkansas 3 29.66 24.10
Arkansas 4 20.56 13.67
California 1 6.33 8.97
California 2 14.09 18.35
California 3 3.76 9.55
California 4 5.54 20.17
California 5 -20.20 -2.08
California 6 -11.53 1.03
California 7 4.87 -5.04
California 8 -14.03 -26.99
California 9 -1.45 -22.80
California 10 0.27 12.14
California 11 -1.36 8.49
California 12 7.32 -4.22
California 13 4.70 -1.48
California 14 18.55 -2.70
California 15 8.32 5.58
California 16 1.09 -0.61
California 17 11.66 -1.14
California 18 1.05 8.99 ~l
California 19 4.11 12.55
California 20 14.94 2.27
California 21 22.11 17.68
California 22 12.47 8.51
California 23 -6.30 11.06
California 24 -25.61 4.88
California 25 -22.51 17.28
California 26 -2.01 -10.85
California 27 -11.69 1.87
California 28 -27.46 12.59
California 29 -28.63 -18.18
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State Congressional
District
Predicted Ideology 80s Predicted Ideology 90s
California 30 -8.19 -23.29
California 31 -11.41 -7.56
California 32 -2.36 -27.36
California 33 17.82 -26.71
California 34 7.73 -0.93
California 35 19.99 -28.63
California 36 4.75 5.16
California 37 17.42 -20.88
California 38 7.08 -1.52
California 39 15.55 14.49
California 40 16.88 16.19
California 41 9.99 14.74
California 42 13.14 4.31
California 43 19.08 13.95
California 44 -7.28 13.27
California 45 9.94 13.03
California 46 -------- 3.67
California 47 17.95
California 48 19.37
California 49 -------- -0.61
California 50 -------- -4.59
California 51 —  ! 16.41
California 52 — 13.18
Colorado 1 -8.12 -6.72
Colorado 2 10.28 8.50
Colorado 3 15.18 15.36
Colorado 4 15.51 16.18
Colorado 5 21.03 20.20
Colorado 6 14.79 13.27
Connecticut 1 0.46 1.51
Connecticut 2 10.11 10.50
Connecticut 3 6.38 5.60
Connecticut 4 8.92 7.90
Connecticut 5 14.49 14.68
Connecticut 6 13.34 13.46
Delaware 1 13.57 10.99
Florida 1 28.90 31.80
Florida 2 23.31 21.70
Florida 3 15.66 5.46
Florida 4 26.50 27.24
Florida 5 24.71 23.30
Florida 6 27.93 32.67
Florida 7 17.67 24.95
Florida 8 20.30 21.28
Florida 9 28.28 26.40
Florida 10 27.87 18.32
Florida 11 27.97 12.88
Florida 12 28.37 26.88
Florida 13 31.60 26.33
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State Congressional
District
Predicted Ideology 80s i Predicted Ideology 90s
Florida ! 14 23.53 i 29.23
Florida I 15 15.83 i 27.46
Florida I 16 21.61 I 25.62
Florida 17 4.73 ! -13.77
Florida 18 -1.89 i 16.37
Florida 19 20.71 ! 11.55
Florida 20 —  ! 16.06
Florida 21 " ! 20.03
Florida 22 —  13.21
Florida 23 —  -4.00
Georgia 1 17.96 22.99
Georgia 2 18.73 9.64
Georgia 3 15.66 26.33
Georgia 4 18.18 ! 10.97
Georgia 5 -9.90 ! -9.34
Georgia 6 26.10 ! 29.07
Georgia 7 28.13 I 26.83
Georgia 8 16.94 23.87
Georgia 9 33.17 33.87
Georgia 10 22.07 23.27
Georgia 11 — 13.58
Hawaii 1 -4.48 -2.03
Hawaii 2 1.70 2.03
Idaho 1 21.63 23.61
Idaho 2 23.99 24.31
Illinois 1 -43.84 -26.53
Illinois 2 -23.10 -18.88
Illinois 3 16.02 11.23
Illinois 4 12.00 -22.78
Illinois 5 -3.25 -6.06
Illinois 6 23.84 17.83
Illinois 7 -30.53 -27.51
Illinois 8 -16.00 19.87
Illinois 9 -16.71 -12.95
Illinois 10 19.42 12.79
Illinois 11 5.05 12.21
Illinois 12 25.16 4.11
Illinois 13 24.55 20.75
Illinois 14 18.57 18.51
Illinois 15 18.00 11.87
Illinois 16 14.27 17.92
Illinois 17 10.59 10.90
Illinois 18 14.71 15.36
Illinois 19 14.50 15.05
Illinois 20 13.44 14.35
Illinois 21 8.03 ----------
Illinois 22 13.87 _
Indiana 1 -1.45 3.54
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State Congressional 
i District
! Predicted Ideology 80s | Predicted Ideology 90s
Indiana 2 18.52 ! 19.26
Indiana 3 17.72 17.35
Indiana 4 21.94 23.97
Indiana 5 22.14 25.08
Indiana 6 21.37 28.19
Indiana 7 21.21 23.41
Indiana 8 16.98 14.81
Indiana 9 17.27 19.39
Indiana 10 -0.28 -0.08
Iowa 1 9.86 7.89
Iowa 2 10.37 12.93
Iowa 3 9.62 12.70
Iowa 4 5.04 11.62
Iowa 5 15.27 18.44
Iowa 6 14.96 —
Kansas 1 24.94 27.57
Kansas 2 11.66 18.56
Kansas 3 14.26 13.68
Kansas 4 11.33 19.62
Kansas 5 20.04 —
Kentucky 1 13.72 14.87
Kentucky 2 17.38 18.98
Kentucky 3 1.01 3.90
Kentucky 4 21.07 18.74
Kentucky 5 23.92 17.07
Kentucky 6 10.79 11.92
Kentucky 7 11.45 ! —
Louisiana 1 23.59 28.60
Louisiana 2 -9.46 -11.19
Louisiana 3 20.61 20.73
Louisiana 4 22.27 7.37
Louisiana 5 28.36 24.38
Louisiana 6 21.94 23.89
Louisiana 7 19.42 18.97
Louisiana 8 16.48 —
Maine 1 14.78 13.74
Maine 2 16.15 16.37
Maryland 1 21.69 18.15
Maryland 2 13.49 17.73
Maryland 3 1.29 0.73
Maryland 4 10.44 -18.40
Maryland 5 -4.99 11.60
Maryland 6 24.34 21.79
Maryland 7 -28.57 -23.07
Maryland 8 4.24 5.69
Massachusetts 1 2.40 3.91
Massachusetts 2 2.78 3.99
Massachusetts 3 5.64 3.72
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State Congressional
District
Predicted Ideology 80s Predicted Ideology 90s
Massachusetts 4 0.26 1.57
Massachusetts 5 5.23 6.48
Massachusetts 6 4.06 5.23
Massachusetts 7 1.38 -2.41
Massachusetts 8 -23.23 i -25.12
Massachusetts 9 -6.10 -0.95
Massachusetts 10 11.83 9.73
Massachusetts 11 0.20 —
Michigan 1 -18.60 18.70
Michigan 2 15.60 23.67
Michigan 3 13.19 19.32
Michigan 4 22.90 21.23
Michigan 5 19.42 14.01
Michigan 6 16.00 16.08
Michigan 7 9.79 18.88
Michigan 8 17.71 14.03
Michigan 9 24.79 9.52
Michigan 10 25.36 17.20
Michigan 11 20.76 17.03
Michigan 12 19.89 10.96
Michigan 13 -31.86 2.47
Michigan 14 17.33 -18.83
Michigan 15 11.18 -26.80
Michigan 16 12.64 11.30
Michigan 17 10.01 —
Michigan 18 27.46 —
Minnesota 1 16.35 17.70
Minnesota 2 18.84 21.13
Minnesota 3 15.77 15.07
Minnesota 4 -2.91 1.33
Minnesota 5 -10.04 -6.45
Minnesota 6 13.50 15.58
Minnesota 7 19.45 20.05
Minnesota 8 9.60 14.88
Mississippi 1 26.37 29.09
Mississippi 2 14.24 9.81
Mississippi 3 29.48 32.22
Mississippi 4 21.27 24.08
Mississippi 5 29.59 29.91
Missouri 1 -13.03 -12.98
Missouri 2 20.26 18.48
Missouri 3 12.15 11.20
Missouri 4 20.96 20.87
Missouri 5 -3.31 0.01
Missouri 6 14.35 15.56
Missouri 7 21.38 20.56
Missouri 8 17.13 15.59
Missouri 9 18.54 17.47
Montana 1 14.08 17.21
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State Congressional
District
Predicted Ideology 80s j Predicted Ideology 90s
i
Montana 2 15.90 I
Nebraska 1 16.82 I 19.58
Nebraska 2 12.29 i 16.06
Nebraska 3 26.17 28.38
Nevada j 1 7.71 I 1.42
Nevada I 2 15.08 I 14.81
New Hampshire 1 17.56 ! 13.95
New Hampshire 2 18.17 I 14.58
New Jersey 1 9.20 ! 4.93
New Jersey 2 14.63 i 12.51
New Jersey 3 14.49 ! 17.53
New Jersey 4 10.97 i 13.43
New Jersey 5 27.37 S 21.67
New Jersey 6 7.60 I 5.20
New Jersey 7 9.14 I 12.71
New Jersey 8 0.27 I 0.95
New Jersey 9 6.72 -1.50
New Jersey 10 -31.83 -25.55
New Jersey 11 12.29 20.25
New Jersey 12 20.13 17.82
New Jersey 13 24.29 -17.75
New Jersey 14 -17.00 —
New Mexico 1 9.03 7.08
New Mexico 2 15.20 14.33
New Mexico 3 12.00 9.67
New York 1 21.80 15.83
New York 2 19.39 13.63
New York 3 21.43 14.39
New York 4 23.85 9.86
New York 5 15.91 2.06
New York 6 -13.68 -20.78
New York 7 -19.41 -16.25
New York 8 -14.33 -31.19
New York 9 -15.93 -12.33
New York 10 -15.46 -37.57
New York 11 -43.76 -41.43
New York 12 -45.82 -34.23
New York 13 -23.63 -6.72
New York 14 3.57 -13.30
New York 15 -33.15 -41.63
New York 16 -52.62 -46.44
New York 17 -41.09 -24.52
New York 18 -51.59 -13.02
New York 19 -19.00 14.55
New York 20 -0.16 9.23
New York 21 18.15 3.23
New York 22 9.86 20.60
New York 23 4.99 17.56
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State | Congressional 
District
| Predicted Ideology 80s ! Predicted Ideology 90s
New York 24 I 21.89 I 16.08
New York 25 I 14.73 I 10.25
New York 26 ! 18.18 9.61
New York 27 I 9.05 ! 22.13
New York 28 I 12.76 ! 5.13
New York 29 I 14.10 10.18
New York 30 i 13.16 4.74
New York 31 ! 17.92 20.08
New York 32 6.90
New York 33 -13.08 j ----
New York 34 ! 20.22 :
North Carolina 1 19.92 7.21
North Carolina 2 12.13 25.45
North Carolina 3 20.42 27.22
North Carolina 4 18.83 15.66
North Carolina 5 24.00 25.55
North Carolina 6 20.71 33.33
North Carolina 7 14.76 21.15
North Carolina 8 26.64 25.84
North Carolina 9 19.67 27.39
North Carolina 10 26.31 37.28
North Carolina 11 26.93 27.02
North Carolina 12 —  I -4.75
North Dakota 1 17.78 19.14
Ohio 1 9.59 3.05
Ohio 2 10.79 24.04
Ohio 3 5.98 8.26
Ohio 4 23.23 23.41
Ohio 5 21.22 22.65
Ohio 6 20.22 17.60
Ohio 7 20.08 19.86
Ohio 8 22.77 23.39
Ohio 9 5.14 6.25
Ohio 10 20.62 8.35
Ohio 11 17.09 -18.66
Ohio 12 12.98 6.20
Ohio 13 14.13 17.86
Ohio 14 6.43 10.22
Ohio 15 9.31 5.64
Ohio 16 15.41 17.89
Ohio 17 2.64 9.89
Ohio 18 12.61 18.67
Ohio 19 14.36 14.94
Ohio ! 20 2.38 —
Ohio 21 -23.90 —
Oklahoma 1 14.63 16.48
Oklahoma 2 19.33 17.60
Oklahoma i 3 15.01 16.12
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State Congressional
District
Predicted Ideology 80s | Predicted Ideology 90s
!
Oklahoma 4 16.57 17.80
Oklahoma 5 20.89 22.79
Oklahoma 6 17.77 18.03
Oregon 1 6.91 6.94
Oregon 2 16.86 19.53
Oregon 3 -3.45 -0.25
Oregon 4 7.95 12.53
Oregon 5 11.36 13.19
Pennsylvania 1 -11.08 -17.02
Pennsylvania 2 -27.44 -22.09
Pennsylvania 3 10.33 3.28
Pennsylvania 4 10.91 14.06
Pennsylvania 5 17.81 21.67
Pennsylvania 6 18.02 20.10
Pennsylvania 7 16.30 15.54
Pennsylvania 8 17.74 16.48
Pennsylvania 9 22.18 25.66
Pennsylvania 10 16.49 18.10
Pennsylvania 11 10.88 14.64
Pennsylvania 12 11.39 12.91
Pennsylvania 13 12.64 10.51
Pennsylvania 14 -15.09 2.01
Pennsylvania 15 11.74 17.58
Pennsylvania 16 21.67 18.59
Pennsylvania 17 17.51 13.79
Pennsylvania 18 14.94 6.66
Pennsylvania 19 21.22 23.18
Pennsylvania 20 -0.94 14.13
Pennsylvania 21 11.23 17.79
Pennsylvania 22 3.01 i —
Pennsylvania 23 17.50 —
Rhode Island 1 -0.38 -1.67
Rhode island 2 2.89 4.78
South Carolina 1 19.81 26.34
South Carolina 2 22.18 26.46
South Carolina 3 28.12 30.70
South Carolina 4 25.00 28.09
South Carolina 5 23.82 25.13
South Carolina 6 22.32 7.93
South Dakota 1 16.17 16.65
Tennessee 1 23.75 22.38
Tennessee 2 16.28 15.59
Tennessee 3 14.86 13.05
Tennessee 4 17.49 16.95
Tennessee 5 4.64 i -1.08
Tennessee 6 18.04 i 15.47
Tennessee 7 21.52 i 17.76
Tennessee 8 12.69 I 11.55
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State Congressional
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Tennessee 9 -11.96 -11.70
Texas 1 23.15 26.21
Texas 2 21.55 25.79
Texas 3 25.59 31.72
Texas 4 25.68 32.61
Texas 5 5.50 17.91
Texas 6 27.27 29.91
Texas 7 28.88 28.53
Texas 8 17.20 33.82
Texas 9 12.07 16.73
Texas 10 8.67 5.90
Texas 11 19.13 21.26
Texas 12 12.69 19.14
Texas 13 26.52 24.04
Texas 14 25.13 26.64
Texas 15 11.63 19.73
Texas 16 9.48 5.05
Texas 17 25.18 16.65
Texas 18 -18.15 -1.35
Texas 19 24.61 23.26
Texas 20 -1.98 13.56
Texas 21 30.21 32.03
Texas 22 15.38 21.51
Texas 23 17.44 26.35
Texas 24 4.16 14.05
Texas 25 6.46 8.90
Texas 26 30.40 27.24
Texas 27 9.28 11.09
Texas 28 —  i 10.26
Texas 29 —  ! 0.99
Texas 30 — -9.22
Utah 1 25.83 27.04
Utah 2 12.12 15.75
Utah 3 24.65 25.49
Vermont 1 14.37 12.29
Virginia ! 1 14.19 20.30
Virginia 2 4.53 10.04
Virginia 3 10.70 -13.45
Virginia 4 9.97 15.62
Virginia 5 21.61 18.69
Virginia 6 16.96 17.09
Virginia 7 21.66 22.35
Virginia 8 12.41 -0.52
Virginia 9 16.99 17.20
Virginia 10 6.33 22.89
Virginia 11 — 10.17
Washington 1 10.99 9.93
Washington ! 2 13.76 13.02
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State Congressional
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Washington 3 9.53 11.35
Washington 4 15.33 16.59
Washington 5 11.36 12.92
Washington 6 4.71 8.11
Washington 7 -12.35 -13.10
Washington 8 16.38 15.33
Washington 9 — 5.95
West Virginia 1 12.49 14.72
West Virginia 2 16.86 15.58
West Virginia 3 13.16 9.73
West Virginia 4 9.51 —
Wisconsin 1 8.76 12.10
Wisconsin 2 4.99 4.57
Wisconsin 3 13.99 13.87
Wisconsin 4 -1.59 7.47
Wisconsin 5 -13.94 -8.59
Wisconsin 6 17.49 19.28
Wisconsin 7 14.49 16.61
Wisconsin 8 17.38 18.45
Wisconsin 9 20.44 23.84
Wyoming 1 18.20 19.53
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APPENDIX D: COMPUTATION OF SULLIVAN DIVERSITY INDEX
1. Education Level 4. Race
a. .310 Less than 12 years a. .673 White
b. .318 High school graduate b. .308 Black
c. .228 Some college c. .019 Other
d. .144 College degree
2. Employment 5. Ethnicity
a. .244 . Managerial and professional a. .979 Native
b. .315 Technical, sales, and administrative b. .021 Foreign bom
support
c. .292 Service occupations
d. .148 Laborers
3. Income
a. .383 Less than $20,000
b. .330 Between S20.000 and 39,999
c. .176 Between $40,000 and 59,999
d. .121 More than $60,000
A* = 1 - (Zc P2/V)
Aw is the index of diversity within a population.
P is the proportion of the population within a given category of each variable used in the
index.
C is the total number of categories within all variables.
V is the number of variables.
Ec P2 = [(.310)2 + .(318)2 + (.228)2 +(.144)2 + (.244)2 +(.315)2 + (,292)2 + (.148)2 + (.383)2 + 
(.330)2 + (.176)2 + (.121 )2 + (.673)2 + (308)2 + (.019)2 + (.979)2 + (.021)2]
= (.096 + .101 + .052 + .021 + .060 + .100 + .085 + .022 + .147 + .109 + .031 + .015 + .453 
+ .001 + .958+ .001)
= 2.344
V = 5  
Therefore,
Aw = 1 - (2.344/5)
= 1- .469 
= .531
On the average, two randomly selected individuals from Louisiana would differ on 61 percent of 
these characteristics.
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APPENDIX E: VARIABLES FOR RESPONSIVENESS MODELS
Variable Description
State Ideology
State Ideology will be based on Erikson, Wright, and Mclver's 
ideological scores for the United States; re-coded in order to 
provide corresponding polarity with Poole and Rosenthal’s Roll- 
Call Conservatism index. Erikson, Wright, and Mclver's scores 
are measured as the mean ideological positions of respondents 
to CBS/NYT surveys 1976-92 for each state.
U.S. House District 
Ideology
District Ideology is measured utilizing a "top-down" simulation of 
House district opinion. I model state-level ideology as a function 
of various demographic and political variables found at both the 
state and House district levels, and then use the estimates from 
the state-level model to generate predicted ideology scores for 
each House district (see Chapter 4 and Appendix III)
Republican Presidential 
Vote
Republican Presidential Vote is measured as the proportion of 
the vote that the Republican Presidential Candidate received in 
the current decade’s presidential elections.
Member Party
Member party is simply coded as 0 for Democrats and 1 for 
Republicans.
Heterogeneity
Constituent Heterogeneity is measured by the methods 
proposed by William Koetzle (1997) (See chapter 4).
Electoral Margin
Elections margin is measured as the difference in the vote 
proportion for the incumbent and the vote proportion for the 
second-place finisher in the previous election.
Electoral Margin2
Squared election margin is measured as the squared difference 
in the vote proportion for the incumbent and the vote proportion 
for the second-place finisher in the previous election.
Presidential Electoral 
Margin
Presidential Election margin is measured as the difference in the 
vote proportion for the Democrat and Republican candidates in 
the presidential elections of the current decade.
Retirement
Retirement is coded 1 for congressmen not running for 
reelection in the forthcoming election and 0 for congressmen 
who do run for reelection in the forthcoming election.
Electoral Proximity
Electoral proximity is simply coded as 0 for the first two 
congresses of a senator’s term and 1 for the last Congress of a 
senator’s term.
Seniority
Seniority is measured as the numbers of year's a congressman 
have continuously served in their present chamber.
College Graduates
College Graduates is simply measured as the percentage of 
college graduates within each district
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V ITA
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